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ABSTRACT
In 2004, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Association (SUWA), that environmentalists could
not obtain injunctive relief against the failure of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to regulate growing off-road vehicle (ORV) use
in federal wilderness study areas in Utah, despite a statutory directive
that BLM prevent “impairment” of such areas, and despite BLM’s
promises in its land plan that it would monitor ORV use and close
the areas if warranted.
The Court acknowledged that the
Administrative Procedure Act authorized federal courts to compel
action in the face of agency inaction. However, the Court held that
BLM’s failure to act to prevent impairment was not actionable
because Congress had not directed BLM to take a “discrete” action,
instead leaving the agency with considerable discretion as to how to
prevent impairment.
The decision in SUWA has produced
widespread ramifications: federal land managers have employed it to
successfully insulate from judicial review a wide variety of federal
actions as well as inactions. Moreover, the Bush Administration
seized upon the decision as a justification for redefining national
forest land plans as aspirational in nature, without making any
binding commitments as to particular authorized activities or land
suitability.
The Administration also moved to eliminate
environmental review of national forest plans, claiming that, under
its redefinition, plans produce no environmental effects, an effort that
was subsequently stalled by the courts.
This article discusses these developments, maintaining that they
are inconsistent with the congressional commitment to federal land
planning made in 1976 in both the Federal Land Management and
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Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act. Thirty years
ago, Congress created modern federal land planning as the
cornerstone of greater public involvement in public land decision
making. SUWA and its aftermath have destroyed that vision,
making public land plans virtually irrelevant and a large waste of
taxpayer dollars. If effective public participation in federal land
planning requires that the public be able to enforce the promises
made in land plans, Congress must amend the authorizing statutes to
restore federal land plans as legally significant commitments of
public resources.
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I.

In 1976, Congress committed to land use planning on federal
public lands by enacting both the National Forest Management Act
1
(NFMA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
2
(FLPMA). Signing NFMA into law, President Ford announced that
the statute “reaffirms and further defines the concept of multiple use1. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976).
2. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).
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sustained yield management and outlines policies and procedures for
land management planning in the national forest system. . . . [T]his
act guarantees the public full opportunity to participate in National
3
Forest land and resource planning.” Actually, the Forest Service has
engaged in some form of planning since the turn-of-the-century days
of Gifford Pinchot, although the agency conducted its planning
activities without significant congressional oversight or formal public
4
involvement until the 1970s.
As it did in NFMA, Congress in FLPMA incorporated the
principles of multiple use management from the 1960 Multiple-Use
5
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) into its management requirements.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the product of a 1946
merger between the Grazing Service and General Land Office, had
engaged in little systematic planning during the first thirty years of its
6
Thus, FLPMA marked a fundamental shift in the
existence.
management of BLM’s public lands, providing BLM with organic

3. DENNIS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE: THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE
STATUTORY AUTHORITY DURING THE 1970S 78 (1984), citing 3 PUB. PAPERS 2619-21(Oct. 22,
1976).
4. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE
PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 15 (Island Press 1987).
5. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV:
FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1983) (observing that, with
little debate, Congress based FLPMA’s multiple use management requirements on the Forest
Service’s 1960 MUSYA).
6. See George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained
Yield Planning on the Public Lands, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 411, 447 (1982) (noting that the lack of
adequate funding and planning authority for the agency contributed to the general lack of BLM
planning during the first decades of its existence). Congressionally-directed BLM planning
began in 1969, when BLM began to implement the Classification and Multiple-Use Act of 1964
(CMUA). 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970). The CMUA required BLM to prepare
Management Framework Plans for the lands under its control and provided the Secretary of
Interior with greater authority to classify public lands for disposal or retention as federal public
lands. When the Public Land Law Review Commission issued its report on the nation’s public
lands in 1970, which automatically caused the CMUA to expire, 180 million acres of federal land
had been classified or reclassified under the CMUA. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT
L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §10D:21 (2007). See also George
Cameron Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning On the Federal Lands, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 307, 317 (1990) (describing planning under the CMUA as “early and primitive”
and noting that such plans were developed following a different procedure, and contained
different information, than plans that would later be developed under FLPMA); Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 876 (1990) (discussing the classification provisions of the CMUA).
See also infra note 66 (discussing BLM’s formation).
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7

authority for the first time. FLPMA also made planning the
8
centerpiece of BLM land management.
In NFMA and FLPMA, Congress assigned federal land
managers new responsibilities, while reining in their discretion by
9
subjecting them to public accountability and scrutiny. Both statutes
reflected a federal commitment to public involvement, congressional
oversight, and long-range planning as the central tenets of public land
10
decision making.
But federal land planning has been emasculated in the 21st
century, as the Supreme Court has ruled that land use plans are not
11
12
ripe for judicial review, and that plan terms are not enforceable.
These decisions have led at least the Forest Service to conclude that
land plans are merely aspirational statements of good intentions, and
that plans require no analysis of their environmental effects under the
13
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). These developments
have fundamentally altered the nature of land planning on federal
public lands, removing the public from the planning process and
insulating agencies from challenges to planning decisions. Congress
intended public planning to be the fulcrum of FLPMA and NFMA,
but recent changes in Forest Service planning regulations have
14
undermined the public planning process. These regulatory changes
seem designed to impose limits on environmental challenges to
agency decisions at the programmatic level, which will produce

7. Coggins, supra note 5, at 26-27. On the significance of organic statutes, see Robert L.
Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic
Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q. 457 (2002).
8. See Coggins, supra note 5, at 15. See also S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES,
95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT
OF 1976 (1978).
9. S. REP. NO. 94-583, at 7 (1975), reprinted in S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., supra note 8, at 72.
10. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 339 (2d ed. 1980).
11. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998).
12. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004).
13. See National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing,
Revising, or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481
(Dec. 15, 2006) (categorically excluding Forest Service forest plans developed under the 2005
planning rule from NEPA analysis); see also infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the 2006 forest planning categorical exclusion).
14. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5,
2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (describing the Forest Service’s revised regulations
for NFMA forest planning); see also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text (discussing the
Bush Administration’s 2005 planning rule).
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piecemeal litigation and shield a wide swath of public land use
decisions from judicial review.
The result is the effective
abandonment by at least one land management agency of the
considerable public resources devoted to the planning process over
15
This article maintains that these
the past three decades.
developments represent a giant leap backward for federal land
management agencies and argues that Congress must restore federal
land planning and return to its roots if the public is to participate
effectively in agency decision-making processes.
Effective federal land planning suffered a serious blow in 2004,
when a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) that a plan provision stating that BLM
“will” monitor off-road vehicle (ORV) use was not a legally binding
16
commitment. Environmentalists sued under section 706(1) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to “compel agency action
17
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” arguing that BLM’s
failure to control or even monitor ORV use within wilderness study

15. NFMA requires the Forest Service to prepare a forest plan every fifteen years for each
of the 155 national forests it manages, at an estimated cost of $5 million to $7 million per plan.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (2000) (requiring plans be revised whenever the Secretary finds a
forest’s conditions have changed “significantly” but at least every fifteen years); see also In One
of His Last Acts, Bosworth Defends Planning Rule, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, Jan. 19, 2007, at 5.
Unlike the Forest Service, BLM does not have statutory or regulatory timelines for plan
revisions. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-6 (2006) (requiring BLM to revise land use plans “as
necessary, based on . . . new data, new or revised policy and changes in circumstances affecting
the entire plan or major portions of the plan”).
Planning is expensive, but one of the congressional goals in establishing the planning
process was to ensure better funding for the Forest Service, so that the agency would have
sufficient resources to make informed and reasoned decisions that took into account a wider
range of information and interests than commodity production. In the five years following
NFMA’s passage, Forest Service appropriations nearly doubled. LEMASTER, supra note 3, at
151. In recent years, however, the Forest Service’s budget has been slashed: President Bush’s
2008 budget proposed reducing Forest Service funding from the previous year by $64 million,
resulting in a budget request for the agency totaling $4.1 billion. Rocky Barker, Forest Service
Money Is Drying Up, IDAHO STATESMAN, May 13, 2007, at 1. While appropriations for land
use planning have been relatively flat in recent years, with $52.6 million marked for planning for
2008, or 1.28% of the agency’s budget, the proportion of the Forest Service budget consumed by
firefighting costs has increased dramatically. Id. In 2006, the agency spent $1.6 billion fighting
fires, more than 40% of its entire budget. Id. See also infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text
(discussing Forest Service spending on land use planning).
BLM’s budget was also reduced for 2008, although less dramatically: BLM’s 2008 budget of
$1.85 million is just $5 million less than its 2006 budget. See Bush’s Budget, 2008, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, at 3; see also infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing
BLM spending on land use planning).
16. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
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18

areas (WSAs) in Utah violated both FLPMA and NEPA. Although
the Tenth Circuit agreed that FLPMA required BLM to take action
to preserve the wilderness characteristics of WSAs and manage the
19
lands consistent with applicable land management plans, and that
NEPA required the agency to take a “hard look” at whether it
needed to supplement its environmental impact statement (EIS) on
20
the land plan to account for a substantial increase in ORV use, the
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court held that while FLPMA required BLM to manage
WSAs in a manner not to impair wilderness characteristics, the
agency possessed wide discretion to decide how to comply with this
statutory directive, and thus BLM need not ban ORV use in the
21
areas. Further, the SUWA court ruled that although BLM may not
act in a manner inconsistent with a land plan, a plan’s provisions are
not usually judicially enforceable because land plans only guide, not
22
The Court also decided that even
generally prescribe, actions.
though BLM’s decision to approve a land use plan may require
NEPA analysis, once approved there is no further “major Federal
23
action” involved in a land use plan requiring EIS supplementation.
The SUWA decision echoed a conclusion the Court reached in
the context of national forest plans six years earlier. In 1998, in Ohio
Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, the Court ruled that

18. FLPMA required BLM to review roadless areas larger than 5000 acres to determine
their suitability for designation as wilderness. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000). See infra notes 123-26
(discussing WSAs in Utah).
19. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton (SUWA I), 301 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002)
(construing section 603(c) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2000), which requires BLM to
“continue to manage [WSAs] . . . in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for
preservation as wilderness”). In addition, the Tenth Circuit interpreted section 302(a) of
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000), which requires BLM to “manage the public lands . . . in
accordance with the land use plans . . . when they are available.” SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1233.
BLM’s regulations prevent the agency from acting in a way that is inconsistent with an area’s
land management plan. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2005) (“All future resource management
authorizations and actions . . . and subsequent more detailed or specific planning, shall conform
to the approved plan”).
20. See SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1239 (concluding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to
supplement the EIS on the applicable BLM resource management plan to account for
substantial increases in ORV use).
21. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66.
22. Id. at 71.
23. Id. at 73. The Court did note that a supplemental NEPA analysis may be required
when the agency revises or amends a land use plan. Id. Also, the Court stated that plans that
commit specific areas to ORV use would be reviewable. Id. at 69 n. 4. It would also seem that
plans that authorize activities such as continued grazing levels should be reviewable.
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environmentalists could not challenge the forest plan for the Wayne
National Forest because federal land plans are generally not ripe for
24
review.
Both Ohio Forestry and SUWA placed significant
roadblocks in the path of challenges to planning decisions, virtually
eliminating the public’s ability to challenge agency land management
decisions on a programmatic level. Even more ominously, the two
decisions have encouraged land management agencies to significantly
revise their conception of a land management plan, from a vehicle for
determining which lands are suitable for various activities to
paperwork that makes no commitments about land suitability and
sets few, if any, standards governing future activities.
Responding to the Supreme Court’s two decisions, in 2005 the
Forest Service issued a new rule significantly amending its forest plan
25
rules. Citing both Ohio Forestry and SUWA in its preamble, the
new rule emphasized the “strategic” nature of land management
plans, which now would authorize no specific projects, merely
“characteriz[ing]” future conditions and providing “guidance” for
26
future decisions. Then, in late 2006, the Forest Service delivered the
coup de grace to the planning process by amending the Forest Service
Handbook to create a new categorical exclusion (CX) that exempted
24. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). Ohio Forestry did not
preclude judicial review of all forest plan terms, however. The Court noted that claims based on
a forest plan’s ORV use restrictions, road closures, or trail construction provisions would not
have been barred. Id. at 738. However, because the Sierra Club did not raise these arguments
below, the Court refused to consider them in reaching its decision. See infra notes 119-21
(discussing challenges to forest plans not barred by Ohio Forestry).
25. See Theo Stein, Forest Management “Streamlined” Bush’s Rules Simplify the Planning
Process, but Critics Say Timber and Mining Firms Will Benefit, DENVER POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at
A1 (noting that Bush Administration officials billed the new rule as a means of streamlining the
planning process by reducing the time the agency would spend revising each forest plan and
cutting planning costs by nearly a third); see also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the Bush Administration’s 2005 planning rule).
26. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1025 (Jan. 5,
2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219). The Forest Service promulgated the 2005 planning
rule without seeking advice from a Committee of Scientists, a group of independent experts that
Congress required the Forest Service to assemble in NFMA to advise the agency in developing
land plan regulations. See George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Service Law: The
Battle over the Forest Service Planning Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 21–22 (2004) (noting that
Democratic members of Congress, critical of the proposed planning rule, “chastised” the Bush
Administration for making decisions without consulting a committee of scientists, a departure
from “a long pattern of employing scientific advisers to help resolve difficult forest policy
conflicts”). NFMA requires that the Secretary of Agriculture, before promulgating regulations
governing land planning, to “appoint a committee of scientists who are not officers or
employees of the Forest Service. The committee shall provide scientific and technical advice
and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures to assure that an effective interdisciplinary
approach is proposed and adopted.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2000).

112

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 18:105

forest plans, plan amendments, and plan revisions under the 2005
27
planning rule from NEPA documentation. The agency again cited
both SUWA and Ohio Forestry in its preamble to support its
characterization of land plans as merely “strategic and aspirational,”
28
and thus without any direct environmental effects.
This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in SUWA in
the context of these recent rollbacks in federal land planning. Section
I begins with a discussion of the congressional intent in making land
planning a focal point of both NFMA and FLPMA and proceeds to
discuss the federal government’s considerable investments in public
land planning over the last thirty years. Section II analyzes the
Court’s decision in SUWA. Section III explains how lower courts
have interpreted SUWA to limit opportunities for the public to hold
agencies accountable for their planning decisions. Section IV
discusses recent agency policies reflecting an understanding that,
under SUWA and Ohio Forestry, federal land use plans are
unenforceable, aspirational documents, and abandoning the notion of
planning as an informed, public process that Congress intended to
govern public lands management. Section IV posits that this
redefinition of planning suggests a reemergence of a focus on
commodity production that originally led Congress to require
agencies to open up their decision-making procedures through the
land planning process. This article concludes that in light of the
immense resources that have been devoted to public land planning,
the benefits derived from widespread public participation, and the
congressional intent to make planning the focus of both FLPMA and
NFMA, Congress should respond to the Ohio Forestry and SUWA
decisions by reinvigorating federal land planning and making federal
land management agencies publicly accountable for their planning
decisions.
27. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising,
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481 (Dec. 15,
2006). This CX (see above) was just the latest in a series of congressional and administrative
actions aimed at “streamlining” the NEPA process by exempting a wide range of activities from
environmental review. See ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL
ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 7-10, Georgetown Envtl. L. &
Pol’y Inst. 2005 (describing how expanded use of CXs, restrictions on the substance of
environmental review, and restrictions on public participation and judicial review have been
used in recent years to weaken NEPA); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 352–55 (2004) (discussing the Bush Administration task force formed
to reform NEPA that recommended expanding the use of CXs).
28. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising,
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,483.
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I. BACKGROUND: RESOURCE PLANNING ON THE PUBLIC LANDS
Although the Forest Service engaged in some form of planning in
its early days under Gifford Pinchot’s direction, congressionally29
mandated, forest-wide planning did not begin until the 1970s.
NFMA changed national forest management, as well as the
relationship between Congress and the Forest Service, by imposing
substantive planning procedures that required public participation,
and by holding the Forest Service accountable for its management
30
decisions by subjecting them to judicial review. Congress also made
planning and public involvement centerpieces of BLM land
31
management in FLPMA.
By requiring public participation in
planning decisions, both NFMA and FLPMA created processes that
involved the public early in the land management process, before
BLM and the Forest Service could commit to a specific course of
action. Once an agency has chosen a specific course of action, it
becomes a project proponent, and the public’s influence diminishes.
But the price of such open-minded land planning was not cheap—
both BLM and the Forest Service spend millions of dollars
32
developing each federal land plan.
A. National Forest Planning
The Forest Service is responsible for managing more than 191
million acres of land, including 155 national forests, 20 national
33
grasslands, and eight land utilization projects. In the Organic Act of
29. Congress passed NFMA, which required forest-wide planning, in 1976. See supra note
2 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of NFMA and FLPMA).
30. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72 (noting that before Congress exerted
control over forest management in the 1970s, “Forest Service decisions were considered
protected by an aura of virtual unreviewability”). As an example, Wilkinson and Anderson
claimed that they were not able to uncover any evidence of a Forest Service activity being
restrained by an injunction before 1970. Id. The authors cite Parker v. United States, 309 F.
Supp. 593, 601 (D. Colo. 1970), aff’d 448 F. 2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971) (enjoining the Forest Service
from completing a timber sale in a potential wilderness area in the White River National Forest
until the President made a final decision on the area’s wilderness designation), as the first case
producing an injunction.
31. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (2000) (stating it is in the “national interest” for public lands
to be managed “through a land use planning process”); § 1701(a)(5) (requiring public
participation in developing regulations governing public land decision making); see also
Coggins, supra note 5, at 10-11 (noting that congressional policies in FLPMA include the intent
that “[i]nventorying and planning should become the central focus of rangeland management,”
as well as the intent to increase public involvement in BLM decision making).
32. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text (discussing the federal investment in land
planning).
33. Office of the Fed. Reg., U. S. Government Manual 118 (2006–07).
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1897 (Organic Act), Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture to
manage the lands that would later become the national forest system
to “regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
34
Federal forest planning began under
thereon from destruction.”
Gifford Pinchot, who in 1898 ushered in plans for managing timber
lands for both harvest and forest preservation as the head of the
Department of Agriculture’s Division of Forestry, some seven years
before authority to manage federal national forest lands would be
35
officially transferred to the Agriculture Department. The Organic
Act gave the Forest Service broad authority by supplying only vague
36
directives for managing national forest land. Land planning would
remain an agency-driven process until the 1970s.
Congressional involvement in Forest Service planning began
37
with the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960. In
MUSYA, Congress expanded the purposes the Forest Service must
consider in managing forests beyond the watershed and timber uses
38
established in the Organic Act to include recreation, range, wildlife,
39
and fish. The Forest Service implemented MUSYA’s requirement
that the agency give “due consideration” in its management decisions
40
to the “relative values” of an area’s resources through planning.
During the next decade, Forest Service planning for wilderness areas
41
began under the Wilderness Act of 1964, and the National
42
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 , which added a critical

34. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
35. The Department of Interior General Land Office managed the nation’s forest reserves
until 1905, when Congress transferred authority to manage the reserves to the Department of
Agriculture Division of Forestry, which soon thereafter became the Forest Service. See id. § 472
(transferring forest management authority to the Secretary of Agriculture). Congress
designated the forest reserves as national forests in 1907, ten years after passing the Organic
Act. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing the beginnings of national
forest planning).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 551.
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31.
38. See id. § 475 (declaring the purposes for establishing the national forests to be “to
improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber”).
39. Id. § 528.
40. Id. § 529. Under the MUSYA, the Forest Service began to use planning for resource
functions, such as wildlife and recreation, and it began to use zoning to designate areas
appropriate for particular uses. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 30–31
(describing the dual planning processes that the Forest Service developed in response to the
MUSYA as the “parents of the integrated land and resource planning” in NFMA).
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
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43

component by requiring public involvement.
Congress became
more actively involved in Forest Service planning with the enactment
of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
44
1974 (RPA), which required the Forest Service to meet national
goals for forest resource allocation and compile periodic assessments
45
of the nation’s forest resources.
Drafted during the Nixon
Administration by a Congress aiming to limit that administration’s
efforts to regionalize Forest Service administration while increasing
46
congressional control over national forest management decisions,
the RPA added “top-down” planning by imposing national planning
requirements on the Forest Service to supplement the forest-level
47
planning the agency historically practiced.
The RPA produced no immediate changes in the Forest Service’s
management practices, which, during the 1960s and 1970s, included
48
increased timber sales and clearcutting. But the year after Congress
passed the RPA, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an injunction against
clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest, ruling that the
clearcuts (“even-aged timber harvests”) violated the terms of the
Organic Act, which required timber on national forest land to be
49
“marked and designated” prior to sale. Congress responded to the

43. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 32-33 (discussing how the Wilderness
Act brought about a Forest Service decision to inventory roadless areas, and how, in addition to
increasing public participation in Forest Service decision making, NEPA required the agency to
analyze environmental effects of mining on its lands and prompted it to develop detailed
resource inventories).
44. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA), Pub. L. 93378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1610 (2000)). The RPA was among
the first bills President Ford signed into law, just over a week after President Nixon resigned on
Aug. 9, 1974. LE MASTER, supra note 3, at 49.
45. TRASK & FAIRFAX, supra note 10, at 324–25. The RPA grew out of timber industry
efforts in the late 1960s to promote legislation which would increase Forest Service funding to
allow for more intensive management of high-quality timber sites and require the Forest Service
to engage in national-level resource planning. When Congress finally passed the RPA, it was a
resource planning and policy statute that some environmentalists also supported. Id.
46. LE MASTER, supra note 3, at 37.
47. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 77. The RPA required the Forest Service
to prepare an assessment describing the renewable resources on its lands every ten years, a
programmatic proposal of long-range objectives for the agency every five years, and an annual
report comparing the agency’s activities to its proposed objectives. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), 1602,
1606(d) (2000).
48. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 41 (discussing how the Forest Service’s
increase in timber sales and clearcutting prompted widespread criticism during the early 1970s).
49. W. Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422, 433
(N.D. W. Va. 1973), aff’d 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed
1976)).
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Monongahela decision the following year by enacting the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, reforming Forest Service
50
timber management policies and repealing the provision in the
51
Organic Act that required trees to be marked prior to sale.
Although controversy over clearcutting and the Monongahela
decision prompted NFMA, that legislation addressed far more than
just clearcutting.
NFMA comprehensively revised the Forest
Service’s land management policies and practices, and significantly
changed the relationship between Congress and the Forest Service by
imposing substantive planning provisions, restricting discretionary
authority over timber harvests and requiring public participation in
52
The Senate Report on NMFA,
Forest Service decision making.
explaining the need for the legislation, quoted President Theodore
Roosevelt:
The reward of foresight for this Nation is great and easily foretold.
But there must be a look ahead, there must be a realization of the
fact that to waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and
exhaust land instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will
result in undermining in the days of our children the very
prosperity which we ought by right to hand down to them amplified
53
and developed.

Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), author of the bill which
54
eventually became NFMA, wanted to ensure that the Forest Service
would not “turn the national forests into tree production programs
55
which override other values.” The Senate committee responsible
for drafting NFMA considered public participation and planning to
be the cornerstones of the legislation, maintaining “that land
management planning and the formulation of regulations to govern

50. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72.
51. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-588, §13, 90 Stat. 2958 (1976).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2000) (public participation); § 1604(f) (required forest plan
provisions); § 1604(g)(3) (timber harvesting).
53. S. REP. NO. 94-893, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6667–68 (1976).
54. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 42. Two bills to reform national forest
management were before the Senate to reform national forest management: Senate Bill 2926, S.
2926, 94th Cong. (1976), proposed by Sen. Randolph (D-W.Va.), established specific timber
management standards, while Sen. Humphrey’s bill, Senate Bill 3091, S. 3091 94th Cong. (1976),
amended the Organic Act to allow clearcutting and required the Forest Service to regulate
timber harvests through forest plans. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 42.
55. Forest and Rangeland Management: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment,
Soil Conservation, and Forestry of the S. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry and the Subcomm.
on the Environment and Land Resources of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong. 262 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey, Chairman, S. Comm. on Agriculture
and Forestry).
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the planning process shall be accomplished with improved
56
By requiring
opportunity for public participation at all levels.”
public and scientific involvement in forest planning, NFMA changed
the Forest Service’s decision-making process and opened the agency’s
57
Congress
decisions to public accountability and judicial scrutiny.
designed the planning process to recalibrate the weight the Forest
Service gave to commodity user interests by involving the public at an
58
early point in the Forest Service’s land management decisions.
NFMA amended the RPA by directing the Secretary of
Agriculture to develop land and resource management plans,
59
consistent with MUYSA, for each unit of the national forest
60
In addition, NFMA required the Forest Service to
system.
promulgate regulations to govern land plans according to the criteria
61
Congress specified in the statute. Among the latter was a directive
that the agency assemble a committee of scientists to supply scientific
and technical advice to the agency concerning its planning
62
63
regulations. Other NFMA provisions restricted timber harvesting,
directed the Forest Service to adopt procedures to ensure preparation
64
of forest plans consistent with NEPA, and required consistency of
65
all contracts and use permits with forest land management plans.
B. BLM Land Planning
Congress created the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in
1946 out of the ashes of the General Land Office (established in 1812)
66
and the Grazing Service (established in 1934). BLM now manages

56. S. REP. NO. 94-893, at 34 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6693.
57. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72.
58. See id. at 69-72 (discussing how congressional concerns regarding an overemphasis on
timber production instead of over other uses influenced NFMA’s planning provisions).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000).
60. Id. §§ 528-531.
61. Id. § 1604(g). For example, NFMA restricted timber harvesting, required the Forest
Service to adopt procedures for ensuring that forest plans were prepared consistent with NEPA,
required the Forest Service to take inventory of resources, and required that all contracts and
permits allowing use of a national forest conform to the forest’s land management plan. Id. §§
1604(g), (i).
62. Id. §1604(h)(1).
63. Id. §1604(g)(3).
64. Id. §1604(g)(1).
65. Id. §1604(i).
66. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 7876 (July 20, 1946). See Al Pierson,
The Bureau of Land Management: A Half-Century of Challenges and Change, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 345, 345 (1997) (discussing the controversy over raising grazing fees from a
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67

262 million acres of land, almost all located in the West. Formal
BLM planning began in the wake of the 1964 Classification and
Multiple Use Act, which required preparation of what were called
68
“management framework plans” (MFPs). NEPA, signed into law
on the first day of 1970, imposed new planning obligations on the
69
agency, especially after a D.C. federal district court ruled that the
agency could not meet its obligations under NEPA by preparing a
single EIS for its entire grazing program but instead had to prepare
EISs on all proposed plans that could produce significant
70
environmental effects. But BLM prepared no systematic, detailed
land plans until after 1976, when Congress passed FLPMA, requiring
preparation of resource management plans (RMPs) with extensive
71
requirements for public participation.
Congress designed planning as the centerpiece of BLM land
72
management. FLPMA required BLM’s RMPs to meet nine criteria,
the majority of which were quite vague, allowing BLM a great deal of
nickel to fifteen cents per animal unit month that led to the decision to merge the Grazing
Service with the General Land Office to create the BLM).
67. U.S. Government Manual, supra note 33, at 251.
68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970); see Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use
Planning, supra note 6, at 307 (discussing the origins of formal land use planning on the federal
lands).
69. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. For a more detailed discussion of early BLM planning, see
Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 317-19.
70. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1974), aff’d per curiam,
527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
71. More than a decade after FLPMA’s planning requirements came into force,
commentators lamented the “inconsistent and difficult” planning efforts undertaken by BLM,
which resulted in resource management plans being prepared for just 12 out of 162 planning
areas by 1987, even under the “drastically revised” planning regulations devised to streamline
planning by limiting public participation promulgated under Interior Secretary Watt. Coggins,
The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 318. For a discussion of the
Department of Interior policies under Secretary Watt, see George Cameron Coggins & Doris
K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary
of Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 489 (1990)
(chronicling Secretary Watt’s attempts to “change the way Interior conducted its business”).
72. Coggins, supra note 5, at 15. The House Report on FLPMA stated that by legislating
formalized policies for managing the public lands, the “proper multiple use mix of retained
public lands is to be achieved by comprehensive land use planning, coordinated with State and
local planning. Planning decisions are to be made only after full opportunity for public
involvement in the planning process. Management and disposal of the public lands are to be
consistent with land use plans so developed.” H. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6176. Like the Forest Service under NFMA, BLM was to “treat land
use planning as dynamic and subject to change with changing conditions and values.” Id. at
6179. Further, the House intended the public participation requirements in FLPMA would not
diminish BLM’s authority and responsibilities to manage the public lands, but instead to
“provide means for input by the interested public before decisions are made.” Id. at 6181.
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73

discretion. Planning was a central focus of FLPMA, a statute in
which Congress declared it was national policy to retain federal
ownership of public lands and requiring any disposition of federal
74
land to be “a result of the land use planning procedure[s].” FLPMA
also directed BLM to manage lands “in accordance with” land use
75
plans.
BLM regulations require the “future management
76
authorizations and actions [to] . . . conform to the approved plan.”
Congress’s integrated planning was also folded into a number of
FLPMA’s substantive provisions regarding land acquisition, disposal,
77
and conveyance. FLPMA also required public participation to be a
78
central element of the FLPMA land planning process.

73. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 321-23.
According to 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000), the land use plans must
1) use and observe the principle of multiple use and sustained yield . . . 2) use a
systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences; 3) give priority to the designation and
protection of areas of critical environmental concern; 4) rely, the to extend it is
available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values; 5)
consider present and potential uses of the public lands; 6) consider the relative scarcity
of the values involved and the availability of alternative means . . . ; 7) weigh long-term
benefits to the public against short-term benefits; 8) provide for compliance with
applicable pollution control laws . . . ; and 9) to the extent consistent with the laws
governing the administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory,
planning, and management activities . . . with the land use planning . . . of other
[federal, state, and local agencies] ....
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000). See also Bureau of Land Management, Land Use Planning
Handbook 1 (Mar. 11, 2005) (establishing policies and guidance for BLM land use planning
under FLPMA).
74. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2000). The statute also called for creating inventories of
resources on public lands such that “their present and future use is projected through a land use
planning process” and for setting “goals and objectives [to] be established by law as guidelines
for public land use planning.” Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), (7). BLM is to rely on these inventories in the
planning process “to the extent [an inventory] is available.” Id. § 1712(c)(4).
75. Id. § 1732(a). FLPMA made an exception to the requirement that BLM manage lands
consistent with the land plan, when available, “where a tract of such public land has been
dedicated to specific uses according to any other provisions of law,” in which case it “shall be
managed in accordance with such law.” Id.
76. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2006).
77. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 323-25. FLPMA
requires that land sales, acquisitions, and conveyances by states must be consistent with land use
plans. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713(a), 1715(b), 1721(c)(1) (2000). Additional FLPMA provisions
required planning in BLM wilderness designation and in managing individual grazing permits.
Id. §§ 1782, 1752(d).
78. FLPMA directs BLM to “allow an opportunity for public involvement and by
regulation shall establish procedures . . . to comment upon and participate in the formulation of
plans and programs relating to the management of the public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f).
Section 103(d) of FLPMA defines “public involvement” as “the opportunity for participation by
affected citizens in rule making, decision making, and planning with respect to the public lands.”
Id. § 1702(d).
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C. Federal Investment in Land Planning
Congress and federal land management agencies have made a
multi-million dollar investment in land use planning since the late
1970s. When the Forest Service began to develop forest plans under
NFMA, the agency estimated that each plan would cost around $1
79
million — roughly $3.6 million in 2007 dollars when adjusted for
80
inflation. By the mid-1980s, however, actual planning costs climbed
to more than $3 million per plan—or $5.76 million in 2007 dollars—
and land planning consumed approximately ten percent of the budget
81
One estimate had the Forest Service
of many national forests.
spending $300 million on plan development to meet NFMA’s goal of
82
The Forest
completing plans for every national forest by 1985.
Service now predicts that plans developed under its 2005 planning
83
rule each will carry a price tag of about $9 million. Even monitoring
and evaluation requirements in forest plans are costly, with the Forest
Service estimating that these costs under the new planning rule will
84
total around $45 million, or about $360,000 per plan.

79. RANDAL O’TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 176 (1988).
80. Dollar values have been adjusted for inflation to reflect 2007 values using the U.S.
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator based on the Consumer
Price Index. The inflation calculator is available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2007).
81. O’TOOLE, supra note 79, at 176.
82. Id. The $300 million figure was based on the 123 plans slated for completion by 1985,
estimating a $2 million per-plan cost for each of the sixty-plus plans that were not complete by
the deadline. Id. at 24. Adjusted for inflation, this figure would amount to $576 million in 2007
dollars. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(c) (2000) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to “attempt” to
incorporate NFMA standards and guidelines into land plans for all units of the national forests
by Sept. 30, 1985). Other estimates of planning costs have been much lower, with one
suggesting that the Forest Service had spent just $250 million on planning by 1996. Steven
Quarles, The Problem with Planning, in THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 135 (1998). Mr. Quarles presented the oral arguments to the Supreme
Court for the intervening industry groups in Ohio Forestry. U.S. Supreme Court Media, Ohio
Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_16/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2007).
83. U.S. FOREST SERVICE & BUSINESS GENETICS, A BUSINESS EVALUATION OF THE 2000
AND PROPOSED NFMA PLANNING RULES 25 (2002). In comparison, the report estimated that
plan revisions developed under the 2000 planning rule would have cost $12.9 million. Id. See
also Robert Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in
Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1189-90 (2005) (discussing cost and procedural hurdles in
federal land planning). Some estimates have placed recent planning costs slightly lower, at $5 to
$7 million per plan. See In One of His Last Acts, Bosworth Defends Planning Rule, PUBLIC
LAND NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, at 5.
84. USDA Forest Service, Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Final Rule (36 CFR 219) for
National Forest Land Management Planning 22 (2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/
includes/cba2.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
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By 1995, the Forest Service had prepared forest plans for all of
85
the 155 national forests under its management. Because forest plans
86
must be revised and reissued at least every fifteen years, most forest
87
plans are in their second generation. In 2005, the Forest Service
88
claimed that it had prepared 150 forest plans and plan revisions, and
the agency anticipated completing another 100 forest plans and plan
89
revisions during the ensuing decade. Using a conservative estimate
of an adjusted $5.8 million cost per plan, the Forest Service has
already spent $870 million on planning alone. Budget appropriations
for Forest Service land management planning have seen a slight, but
steady, decline during the Bush Administration, with the 2008 budget
proposal requesting $52.6 million for land management planning,
along with an additional $166.2 million for monitoring and evaluation
90
Yet land management planning
in the national forest system.

85. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,886
(Apr. 13, 1995). At the time the Forest Service issued the 1995 Federal Register notice, forest
plans had been developed for all but four national forests: the Klamath, Six Rivers, Mendocino,
and Shasta-Trinity National Forests. Id. Forest plans for these forests, all located in Northern
California, were approved by the end of 1995. USDA Forest Service, Land and Resource
Management Plan, Klamath National Forest, 1995; Shasta-Trinity National Forest, Land and
Resource Management Plan, 1995; Mendocino National Forest, Forest Management Plan, 1995;
Six Rivers National Forest LRMP, 1995.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (2000).
87. See USDA Forest Service, Schedule of Forest Service Land Management Plan
Revisions & New Plans, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/LRMP
schedule.pdf (last visited September 21, 2007) (listing land management plans that have been
revised, are in the process of revision, or are in need of revision).
88. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1024 (Jan.
5, 2005) (stating that the Forest Service has prepared 150 forest plans and plan revisions).
Although the Forest Service has prepared a plan for each of the national forests and grasslands
that it manages, the agency has issued a single plan covering multiple areas in some instances.
This practice appears to be most prevalent in plans for forests and grasslands in the Southern
(Region 8) and Rocky Mountain (Region 2) regions. In Region 2, for example, one plan
includes the Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forests, along with the Pawnee National
Grassland, and another single plan covers the Kiowa, Rita Blanca, Black Kettle, and McClellan
Creek National Grasslands. USDA Forest Service, Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forests,
Pawnee National Grassland, http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/arnf/projects/ (last visited May 16, 2007);
Cibola National Forest, Projects & Plans, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/cibola/projects/index.shtml
(last visited May 16, 2007). In Region 8, some plans combine individual forests, while other
plans include all the national forest land in a particular state. USDA Forest Service, Forest
Planning in the Southern Region, http://www.fs.fed.us/r8/planning/status_of_plans.shtml (last
visited May 16, 2007).
89. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1024.
90. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR
2008, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET OVERVIEW D-2 (2007) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE FY2008
BUDGET], available at http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/budget-2008/fy2008-forest-servicebudget-overview.pdf. These figures show a slight decline from 2006, when the Forest Service

122

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 18:105

consumes only a small fraction of the Forest Service’s $4.6 billion
91
2008 budget, just over one percent of the agency’s annual budget.
Funding for BLM land planning also has been in decline under
the Bush Administration, dropping from a budgeted $50 million in
92
2006 to a projected budget of $47 million for the fiscal year 2008.
93
Because BLM’s annual budget, at $1.85 billion for 2008, is less than
half of that of the Forest Service, planning encompasses a slightly
larger proportion of the agency’s annual budget, at roughly 2.5
percent. BLM RMPs have averaged three to four years to complete,
94
at an approximate cost of $2.5 million to $4 million per plan.
Assuming an adjusted $3 million per plan, BLM has spent
approximately $486 million on planning to date.
In 2001, BLM launched an effort to update all of its 162 land
95
plans within a decade. If it completes all these revisions, BLM will
96
spend at least another $512 million on land planning by 2011.
Together, then, BLM and the Forest Service have since the mid1970’s invested more than $1 billion in developing land management
plans and currently spend more than $100 million combined annually
on plan revisions.

received $57.7 for land management planning and $166.2 million for monitoring and evaluation.
Id. By comparison, in 2002, the Forest Service appropriated $70.358 million for land
management planning; in 2003, the figure climbed to $72.158 million, but dropped back down to
$70.868 million for 2004. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE,
FISCAL YEAR 2004, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION I-20, available at http://www.taxpayer.net/
forest/USFSFY04BudgetJustification.pdf.
91. FOREST SERVICE FY2008 BUDGET, at D-5. In comparison, Forest Service spending on
wildland fire management has increased from 13% of the agency’s annual budget in 1991 to
45% of the 2008 budget. Id. at 3.
92. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT – LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
expectmore/detail/10003707.2005.html.
93. See Forest Service Gets Little Public Help in Money Bill Run-Up, PUBLIC LAND NEWS,
May 4, 2007, at 3 (noting that dozens of witnesses voiced their support of BLM programs before
the U.S. House subcommittee on Interior appropriations). Like the Forest Service, BLM also
must devote a large chunk of its annual budget to wildland fire management, with the $801.8
million marked for fire suppression encompassing 43% of BLM’s 2008 budget. See Press
Release, U.S. Department of Interior, President’s Budget Will Improve National Parks,
Working Landscapes, Indian Education and Safety (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.doi.gov/
news/07_News_Releases/070205b.html.
94. See Forest Service Gets Little Public Help in Money Bill Run-Up, PUBLIC LAND
NEWS, May 4, 2007, at 3.
95. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Land Use Planning,
http://www.blm.gov/planning/policy.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
96. This figure is based on an estimated cost of $3.2 million for each of the 162 BLM land
plans.
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II. NORTON V. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
ALLIANCE: UNDERMINING FEDERAL LAND PLANNING
In 2004, in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
97
(SUWA), the Supreme Court placed a substantial roadblock in the
way of members of the public seeking judicial review of federal land
use plans. A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
reversed the Tenth Circuit and rejected environmental claims, ruling
that commitments BLM made in its land use plans were not generally
98
enforceable. The SUWA decision rested on the Court’s conclusion
that the Administrative Procedure Act’s promise to compel agency
99
action extended only to “discrete” agency actions, consistent with
Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy of protecting the Executive from
100
public challenges through citizen suits.
Scalia’s reluctance to
recognize citizens’ standing to challenge public land management
decisions was evident in his 1990 opinion for the Court in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, where he concluded that
environmentalists lacked standing to bring a programmatic challenge
101
against a series of BLM actions in a single lawsuit. Eight years after
Lujan, in Ohio Forestry v. Sierra Club, the Court decided that forest
plans were not usually ripe for judicial review outside the context of a
102
site-specific action. Considered together, Lujan, Ohio Forestry, and
97. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004).
98. See infra notes 144-67, and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s reasoning in
SUWA).
99. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72.
100. See Brett Birdsong, Justice Scalia’s Footprints on the Public Lands, 83 DEN. U. L. REV.
259, 285 (2005) (arguing that “by relying on the traditional elements of mandamus as a limit to
the right to judicial review of agency nonfeasance under the APA,” Justice Scalia has advanced
his agenda of protecting the executive branch from judicial oversight). Other commentators
have found Scalia’s reasoning to be suspect. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal
APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and
the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. J. 979, 985 (2004) (describing the
Court’s restriction of the APA provision allowing agency inaction to be reviewable to be limited
to “discrete” actions to be “remarkably weak,” in light of the APA’s overarching policies and
purposes aimed at maximizing opportunities “to seek meaningful judicial review consistent with
a respect for the discretion retained by the agency”); Justin C. Konrad, Comment, The
Shrinking Scope of Judicial Review in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 515, 534 (2006) (arguing that the FLPMA’s non-impairment mandate satisfied
the Lujan requirements for “agency action” relied on in the Court’s SUWA opinion); Noah
Perch-Ahern, Comment, Broad Programmatic Attacks: SUWA, the Lower Courts’ Responses,
and the Law of Agency Inaction, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 411, 422-29 (2005) (discussing early
responses to SUWA in the lower courts).
101. 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990).
102. 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998). See infra notes 110-18, and accompanying text (discussing the
Court’s Ohio Forestry decision).
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SUWA placed serious constraints on the public’s ability to seek
judicial review of BLM and Forest Service land use planning
decisions.
A. SUWA’s Predecessors: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation and
Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club
Justice Scalia began to lay the groundwork for the Court’s
SUWA decision with his 1990 opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, which restricted citizen suit standing in public land
103
cases.
In Lujan, environmentalists challenged a series of BLM
decisions to reclassify land withdrawals under FLPMA (these
reclassifications opened up previously withdrawn lands to potential
mineral development). The environmentalists claimed that this “land
withdrawal review program” violated FLPMA, NEPA, and the
104
APA.
Although the district court held that the environmentalists
105
lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact,
the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the record was “more than
106
adequate” to establish standing.
But the Supreme Court reversed,
ruling that the environmentalists lacked standing to challenge BLM’s
“land withdrawal review program” because, according to the agency,
107
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
there was in fact no such program.
Court emphasized separation of powers concerns: to allow judicial
intervention in executive decision making on the programmatic level
108
would, he maintained, exceed the “traditional” role of the courts.

103. 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see Brett Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and
Administrative Responsibility for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L. J.
523, 575-78 (2005) (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to interpreting when an agency
regulation is retroactive based on whether the conduct occurs before the regulation’s adoption).
104. 497 U.S. at 877. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (2000) (authorizing BLM to make or modify land
withdrawals). Id. § 1712(d) (authorizing BLM to review land classifications as part of the land
use planning process).
105. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D. D.C. 1988).
106. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 878 F. 2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit
had earlier concluded the environmentalists had standing in this suit when it upheld a
preliminary injunction issued by the district court preventing BLM from making any new
withdrawal revocations or classification terminations. 835 F.2d 305, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g
denied, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
107. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890.
108. Id. at 894. Scalia wrote that “[e]xcept where Congress explicitly provides for [the
Court’s] correction of the administrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in
the administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific ‘final agency action’
has an actual or immediately threatened effect.” Id. See also Birdsong, supra note 100, at 278
(discussing Scalia’s Lujan concerns over programmatic judicial review of executive agency
decisions).
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Thus, the Court rejected the environmentalists’ programmatic
challenge, leaving the environmentalists with the burden of
109
challenging each individual revocation of land withdrawal.
Eight years later, in Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club
(1998), a unanimous Court held that an environmental challenge to
timber cutting goals in a national forest plan was not ripe for judicial
110
review. The Sierra Club had challenged the Wayne National Forest
Plan for allowing excessive logging in general, and excessive
111
clearcutting in particular.
The district court ruled in favor of the
112
But after deciding that the
Forest Service on the merits.
environmentalists’ claims were ripe, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court because it concluded that the Forest Service violated
113
NFMA by favoring clearcutting in its forest plan.
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the environmental claims were not ripe
because forest plans “do not command anyone to do anything or to
refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify

109. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894. After Lujan, a split developed in the appellate courts over
whether land use plans were reviewable by the courts. While both the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits held that suits challenging land use plans were ripe, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
rejected claims challenging land use plans on grounds that the challenges were not ripe outside
the context of site-specific actions. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.
1996) (interpreting Lujan to indicate that a challenge to the forest plan for the Cherokee
National Forest was not ripe); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a forest plan was ripe for review and distinguishing Lujan); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28
F.3d 753, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that environmentalists lacked standing to challenge
the forest plan for the Ouachita National Forest absent a site-specific action, analogizing
challenging a forest plan to the type of programmatic challenge the Court rejected in Lujan);
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1517-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing
Lujan and holding that environmentalists had standing to challenge the forest plan for the Idaho
Panhandle National Forest). See also Trent Baker, Judicial Enforcement of Forest Plans in the
Wake of Ohio Forestry, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 81, 86 (2000) (discussing the split
that developed in the circuits following Lujan that led up to the Court’s Ohio Forestry decision).
110. 523 U.S. 726, 739 (1998).
111. Id. at 728-29. The land plan for the Wayne National Forest allowed logging to take
place on 126,000 acres of the 178,000 acre forest, with a projected timber harvest of 8000 acres,
5000 acres of which were to be clear-cut. Id. (citing USDA Forest Service, Land and Resource
Management Plan, Wayne National Forest A-13 to A-17 (1987)).
112. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 503 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that
the Forest Service had fulfilled its statutory planning requirements under NFMA in adopting
the forest plan).
113. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the Forest Service failed to comply with NFMA’s restrictions on clearcutting
because the planning process favored clearcutting and prioritized timber interests over
recreation and other uses of the forest, rejecting a Forest Service argument that clearcutting
would “provide new opportunities for recreation.” Id.
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any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do not subject
anyone to any civil criminal liability; they create no legal rights or
114
obligations.”
The Forest Service had argued that the forest plan’s
clearcutting provision functioned only as guidance without making a
binding commitment; therefore, a challenge could be ripe only in the
context of a site-specific action because the plan provision had no on115
Justice Breyer adopted the government’s
the-ground effect.
argument in his opinion, characterizing forest plans as mere “tools for
agency planning and management” and concluding that a challenge to
a plan’s terms was not ripe for judicial review until brought in the
116
context of a site-specific action. The environmentalists did achieve
a small victory when the Court held that if a plan made a commitment
to a particular resource, such as authorizing ORV use, that issue
117
Moreover, the Court ruled that the question of
would be ripe.
whether the Forest Service complied with NEPA was also ripe at the
118
time the Forest Service approves a land plan.
After Ohio Forestry, challenges to plans alleging procedural
119
harm, as well as claims that a plan’s provisions would result in

114. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733. Justice Breyer noted that he was paraphrasing United
States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927), where a railroad
challenged a “final report” on the value of its properties that the Interstate Commerce
Commission prepared under what the Court referred to as the “Valuation Act,” actually a series
of amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, requiring the Interstate
Commerce Commission to investigate and make findings regarding the value of railroad
properties. Id. at 307.
115. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 32-33, Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726 (No. 97-16).
116. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.
117. Id. at 738-39. See infra notes 120-121 (discussing challenges to land use plans not
barred by ripeness concerns after Ohio Forestry). This result would also seem to apply to a
plan’s approval of a continuation of authorized grazing levels.
118. A NEPA challenge to a land plan would be ripe because NEPA “simply guarantees a
particular procedure, not a particular result.” Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737. Therefore, a
claim alleging procedural injury arising from an agency’s failure to comply with NEPA in
developing a land plan would be ripe. Justice Breyer further noted that had the Sierra Club
raised the claims that the forest plan’s approval of ORV use, or its failure to close roads or
provide for additional trails, in its complaint “the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to
those provisions of the Plan that produce the harm would be significantly different.” Id. at 738.
119. “[P]rocedural harm” results when the injury arises from an agency’s failure to follow
statutorily required procedures, such as violating NEPA. See Baker, supra note 109, at 105-06
(concluding that although Ohio Forestry recognized that claims of NEPA violations in the
preparation of forest plans, plaintiffs may also be able to show procedural harm under NFMA,
FLPMA, or the ESA); see also Barton J. Birch, Comment: Ohio Forestry and What It Means for
the Future, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 141, 162-66 (2000) (discussing lower courts’ upholding challenges
to land use plans as ripe in limited situations after Ohio Forestry, but concluding that challenges
to substantive plan provisions outside the context of a site-specific action were not ripe).
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120

immediate on-the-ground harm, such as authorization of ORV use,
121
But substantive
could avoid dismissal on ripeness grounds.
challenges to land plans outside the context of a site-specific action
were no longer ripe, requiring members of the public who are
dissatisfied with the content of land plans to bide their time until onthe-ground damage was imminent, no matter how inevitable that
122
damage might have been at the planning stage.
B. The Conflict in SUWA: Unregulated ORV Use in WSAs
SUWA involved a conflict over off-road vehicle (ORV) use on
wilderness study areas on BLM lands in Utah. In 1991, the Secretary
of Interior recommended that Congress designate as wilderness 1.9
million acres of the 5.2 million acres of BLM land that the agency
123
BLM must
inventoried for wilderness characteristics in Utah.
manage a study area under consideration for wilderness designation
as if it were designated wilderness until Congress makes a final
120. The Court noted that had the Sierra Club raised the argument that the forest plan’s
approval of ORV use, its failure to close roads, and its failure to provide for additional trails,
those claims might not have been barred by ripeness doctrine because they could have resulted
in injury to an interested party without additional action. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738. By
inference, this reasoning would also seem to apply to authorizing continuation of grazing.
121. Claims against site-specific actions authorized by land use plans would of course be
ripe. See Baker, supra note 109, at 95-106 (cataloging lower court decisions in challenges to
forest plans during the first two years after Ohio Forestry, and concluding that ripeness
problems did not prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with claims of procedural harm or
challenges alleging site-specific harm). One exception was in the Ninth Circuit, which adopted a
broad interpretation of Ohio Forestry, concluding that a suit challenging the Forest Service’s
failure to implement the monitoring requirements in a plan was not ripe. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v.
United States Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1999).
122. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734 (explaining why broader, non-site-specific suits are
not ripe by stating that “[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its
legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain”).
123. In FLPMA, Congress directed the Secretary of Interior to evaluate all BLM roadless
areas (not merely those in Utah), mostly greater than 5000 acres, for suitability for wilderness
designation under the Wilderness Act, by Oct. 21, 1991. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000). Based on
that inventory, the Act required the Secretary to recommend, “from time to time,” wilderness
lands to the President, whom the statute then required to make recommendations to Congress
within two years of receiving the Secretary’s recommendation, as only Congress may designate
land as wilderness. Id. §§ 1782(a),(b). See Final Wilderness Inventory Decision, 45 Fed. Reg.
75,602, 75,604 (Nov. 14, 1980) (dropping 3.2 million of the 5.2 million acres the BLM
inventoried from further consideration as wilderness for lack of wilderness characteristics);
Bureau of Land Management, UTAH STATE WILDERNESS STUDY REPORT 3 (1991)
(recommending designation of 1.9 million acres); see also Michael C. Blumm, The Bush
Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy: A Trojan Horse Strategy for Advancing
Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,397, 10,404 (2004) (discussing
BLM’s wilderness inventories in Utah, and noting that in the 1990s, environmentalists identified
an additional 5.9 million acres of potential wilderness in Utah that BLM overlooked).
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124

determination about an area’s wilderness status. These “wilderness
study areas” (WSAs) must be roadless and otherwise “without
permanent improvements or human habitation . . . with the imprint of
man’s work substantially unnoticeable” and encompass at least 5,000
acres, or be “of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation
125
and use in an unimpaired condition.”
When Congress was unable
to make final wilderness designations in Utah, FLPMA required
126
BLM to manage the WSAs as de facto wilderness. BLM’s failure to
do so could damage the wilderness characteristics of the WSAs,
effectively preempting the congressional prerogative of designating
127
those areas as wilderness.
Over the last two decades, ORV use has increased exponentially
128
on public lands in Utah and around the country.
In 1999,
environmentalists filed suit to prevent further damage to BLM lands,
seeking to require the agency to limit ORV use in nine Utah WSAs
under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
124. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). BLM issued an “interim management policy” on wilderness
management in 1979. Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Lands Under Wilderness
Review, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Dec. 12, 1979) (requiring BLM to manage WSAs in a manner that
ensures the wilderness values will not be impaired before Congress makes it final
determination). See also S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton (SUWA I), 301 F.3d 1217, 1225
n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) (describing how BLM interpreted FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate in its
interim management policy for WSAs).
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(a)-(c) (2000).
126. See 43 U.S.C § 1782(c) (2000) (requiring BLM to manage WSAs so as “not to impair
the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness . . . “). Congress was not only unable
to designate wilderness areas in Utah, it largely failed to do so throughout the West. Nearly
twenty years later, the only BLM designated wilderness areas are in Arizona, Arizona Desert
Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469, California, California Desert
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471, and in southern Nevada, outside Las
Vegas, Clark County Conservation of Public Land and Natural Resources Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-282, 116 Stat. 1994.
127. The Wilderness Act defines wilderness “as an area where the earth and its community
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain . . . an area
of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence . . . affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable [and
possessing] outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive or unconfined type of
recreation . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000).
128. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 60 (2004). In 2004,
the Forest Service estimated that approximately 42 million people in the United States use
ORVs each year, more than double the number of ORV users two decades before. Id.
Between 1998 and 2003, sales of ORVs doubled, with 900,000 new vehicles sold in the United
States in 2003. Id. In Utah, ORV use has increased even more dramatically, with the number of
registered ORVs in the state climbing from 9,000 in 1979 to 83,000 in 2000, to more than 120,000
in 2007. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Off-Road Vehicles: Searching for Balance and
Quiet in Utah’s Wilderness, http://www.suwa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=work_orv (last
visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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which provides a cause of action to injured members of the public to
129
The
“compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed”.
environmentalists argued that BLM had a “mandatory,
130
nondiscretionary duty” to conduct ORV monitoring in the Henry
Mountains under the Factory Butte area land plan and to complete
131
an ORV implementation plan for the San Rafael plan. The Factory
Butte plan stated that because of existing damage, ORV use in the
area “will be monitored and closed if warranted,” and also more
132
generally provided for “use supervision and monitoring” in WSAs.
In addition to including a similar ORV use monitoring provision, the
San Rafael plan promised that an ORV implementation plan for the
133
area “will be developed.” The environmentalists charged that BLM
failed to take a “hard look” at information about increased ORV use
occurring in WSAs after plan approval to determine whether to
supplement its outdated NEPA analysis for the areas, in order to
134
evaluate the environmental effects of increased ORV activity.
Motorized recreationalists, the state of Utah, and a number of
135
Utah counties intervened on the side of the federal government.
Although the district court criticized BLM for inadequately managing
ORV use in Utah WSAs, writing that “the court might agree with
[SUWA] that too little is done too slowly,” it concluded that BLM
had not entirely abandoned its management duties, and therefore
dismissed the environmentalists’ claims of failing to act under the
136
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim,
APA.
concluding that because the decision to supplement NEPA analysis is
“the kind of factual question that implicates agency technical

129. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1223; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). The APA states that “the
reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1223.
130. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1222.
131. Id. at 1234.
132. See Henry Mountain Resource Area Off-Road Vehicle Implementation Plan (Sept.
1988), in Joint Appendix at 140, Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (No.
03-101); SUWA, 542 U.S. at 68.
133. See Final Resource Management Plan, San Rafael Resource Area (May 1991), in Joint
Appendix at 154 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (No. 03-101); 2003
U.S. Briefs 101, 154; SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1234.
134. See SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1237. BLM had not updated its NEPA analysis for any of the
challenged land plans in more than a decade. Id.
135. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Babbitt, No. 2:99CV852K, 2000 WL 33914094 at *1 (D.
Utah Dec. 22, 2000).
136. Id. at *9.
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expertise,” the court would defer to the agency’s judgment and not
137
require BLM to supplement its NEPA analysis.
The Tenth Circuit reversed in 2002, holding that FLPMA
imposed a nondiscretionary duty on BLM to manage WSAs to
prevent impairment of wilderness values, and that BLM’s
138
management may have violated this standard.
Observing that
under the APA a court may compel an agency to undertake an
“unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld” action, even without a
challenge to a site-specific action, the court ruled that efforts toward
partial compliance did not prevent a court from compelling agency
139
action under the APA.
Further, the court held that BLM had a
“mandatory, nondiscretionary duty” to comply with the ORV use
monitoring provision in the Factory Butte plan and the ORV
140
The Tenth
implementation provision in the San Rafael plan.
Circuit also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the NEPA claim,
ruling that the lower court misconstrued the claim that BLM failed to
take a “hard look” at whether it should supplement its NEPA
analysis as a claim requesting the court to compel BLM to actually
141
The Supreme Court accepted the
supplement its analysis.
142
government’s petition for certiorari and unanimously reversed the
143
Tenth Circuit.
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court considered three issues: (1) whether BLM
violated FLPMA by failing to manage WSAs in a manner that would
prevent impairment; (2) whether BLM violated provisions in its land
plans calling for monitoring ORV use; and (3) whether BLM violated

137. Id.
138. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1224. BLM argued that it could not be compelled to act because it
had taken some steps to address ORV activity by closing some routes and posting signs
prohibiting ORV use in others. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that partial
compliance that falls short of satisfying an actual legal requirement was insufficient to moot a
claim to compel an agency to fulfill its obligations. Id. at 1231.
139. Id. at 1235-36.
140. Id. at 1236.
141. Id. at 1239. A dissent agreed with the majority that BLM could be compelled to take a
hard look to consider whether it should supplement its NEPA analysis. Id. at 1240 (McKay,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 540 U.S. 980 (2003). Motorized recreationalists
also petitioned for certiorari. See Utah Shared Access Alliance v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance
(SUWA), 542 U.S. 917 (2004) (remanding the case after the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
decision in SUWA I).
143. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 56 (2004).
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NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at whether it was necessary for
the agency to produce a supplemental EIS for land plans in areas
experiencing a substantial increase in ORV use that was not
144
In an opinion by
anticipated in the initial EIS on the land plans.
Justice Scalia, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of BLM on all
145
counts.
The Court first addressed when a federal court may order an
agency to take action under the APA, which authorizes suits by
anyone “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
146
relevant statue.” “Agency action,” under the APA, is “the whole or
a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
147
Justice Scalia first
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”
concluded the APA authorizes actions against an agency for a failure
to act only when it fails to take one of the “discrete agency actions”
148
Second, Scalia acknowledged that the APA
mentioned above.
provided courts with the authority to compel agencies to take action
“unlawfully withheld” under a specific statute, which also amounted
149
to a “discrete” action. Thus, under SUWA, there are two forms of
discrete action that are actionable under the APA: one that is
150
specifically mentioned in the APA itself; and one that is specifically
151
required of an agency by another statute. These limitations on suits

144. Id. at 60-61.
145. Id. at 56.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). Only final agency actions may be challenged under the APA.
Id. § 704.
147. Id. § 551(13) (emphasis added).
148. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62.
149. Id. Justice Scalia concluded that “discrete agency actions” were those which fit within
the definition of the different categories of “agency action,” as defined by the APA. Id. The
APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, [or] relief.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000). Under the APA, a “rule” includes “an agency
statement of . . . future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” Id. §
551(4). An “order” includes “a final disposition . . . in a matter other than rulemaking.” Id. §
551(6). A “license” means “a permit . . . or other form of permission.” Id. § 551(8). A
“sanction” includes a “prohibition . . . or . . . taking [of] other compulsory or restrictive action.”
Id. § 551(10). “Relief” includes a “grant of money, assistance, license, authority” or
“recognition of a claim, right, or immunity,” or the “taking of other action on the application or
petition or, and beneficial to a person.” Id. § 551(11).
150. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62; 5 U.S.C. § 551(13); see also supra note 148 and accompanying
text.
151. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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against agencies are, in Justice Scalia’s words, necessary to avoid
152
“broad programmatic attack[s]” on agency decision making.
Scalia did acknowledge the mandatory nature of FLPMA’s
requirement that BLM manage WSAs in a manner that prevents
153
impairment of wilderness characteristics.
But because he thought
BLM had “a great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it,”
the requirement was not the type of “discrete” action which a federal
154
court may compel agency action under the APA.
The Court also rejected SUWA’s claim that BLM violated the
land plans’ promises that ORV use “‘will be monitored and closed if
155
Because BLM
warranted’” by failing to monitor ORV use.
completed a route designation plan for the San Rafael area by the
time the case reached the Court, Justice Scalia declared the claims
regarding that plan to be moot. Concerning BLM’s ORV use
monitoring in the Henry Mountains under the Factory Butte land
156
plan,
Justice Scalia thought that “allowing general enforcement of
plan terms would lead to pervasive interference with BLM’s own
157
ordering of priorities.” Thus, BLM’s failure to undertake an action
that the agency promised, in the land use plan, to undertake did not
violate FLPMA’s requirement that BLM manage lands “in
158
accordance with” land use plans because, in the Court’s view, “a
land use plan is generally a statement of priorities; it guides and

152. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. Justice Scalia also authored Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), in which the Court rejected a challenge to the BLM’s “land
withdrawal review” program on the ground that there was no program, and therefore no agency
action. 797 U.S. at 879, discussed supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text. But see Konrad,
supra note 100, at 534 (arguing that the FLPMA’s non-impairment mandate did in fact satisfy
Lujan’s requirements for “agency action,” which the Court in turn relied on in SUWA).
153. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66.
154. Id. While he did not consider FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate for managing WSAs
to be a “discrete” action that could be challenged under the APA, Justice Scalia earlier
concluded that a biological opinion prepared under the Endangered Species Act was a “final
agency action” challengeable under section 704 of the APA in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
178-79 (1997) (holding that irrigators could challenge a biological opinion addressing Bureau of
Reclamation dam operations on the Klamath River as a final agency action because the opinion
marked the “consummation” of the agency’s decision-making process, and because it had
“direct and appreciable legal consequences”).
155. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 68.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 71. The Court was concerned that allowing land use plan enforcement by citizens
would place an undue burden on land management decision making because “allowing general
enforcement of plan terms would lead to pervasive interference with BLM’s own ordering of
priorities.” Id.
158. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000).
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constrains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case) prescribe
159
Unless a land plan supplies a “clear indication of binding
them.”
commitment,” the Court thought that the judiciary could not compel
160
an agency to take an action based solely on the terms of the plan. A
different conclusion, Justice Scalia opined, would leave federal
agencies with meddlesome lawsuits by environmental plaintiffs and,
161
consequently, future land plans would become “much vaguer.”
Justice Scalia’s professed concern about the future vagueness of
land plans was pure judicial sophistry; in fact, one of the chief legacies
of the SUWA decision has been new Forest Service planning
regulations calling for vague terms in land use plans in order to avoid
creating legally binding commitments that the public could
162
And it was hardly clear why a promise in a land plan
challenge.
163
that an agency “will” undertake a certain action was not such a
“binding commitment.” Nor was it clear what it would take to create
164
such a commitment.
Finally, the Court decided that BLM did not violate NEPA by
failing to take a “hard look” to consider whether it should prepare a
supplemental EIS on land use plans for areas experiencing increased
165
The Court did not analyze whether increased ORV use
ORV use.
166
qualified as a “significant new circumstance” —instead, it
maintained that because the land use plan was not an ongoing major
federal action, additional NEPA analysis would be required only if
167
BLM was amended or revised.
159. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 71.
160. Id. at 69.
161. Id. at 72. According to the Court, such vague land use plans would result in “making
coordination with other agencies more difficult, . . . depriving the public of important
information concerning the agency’s long-range intentions.” Id.
162. See 2006 Memorandum from Coggins et al., updating the 5th ed. of FEDERAL PUBLIC
LAND AND RESOURCES LAW, at 125 (highlighting SUWA’s influence on the 2005 planning rule)
(on file with author). See also infra notes 271-93 (discussing recent agency amendments to the
planning process in the 2005 planning rule).
163. See Henry Mountain Resource Area Off-Road Vehicle Implementation Plan (Sept.
1988), supra note 132 and accompanying text.
164. Justice Scalia unhelpfully suggested that what was required was a “clear indication of
binding commitment in the terms of the plan.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 69.
165. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72.
166. Id. at 73.
167. Id. According to Justice Scalia, because “ ‘[a]pproval of a [land use plan]’ is a ‘major
Federal action’ requiring an EIS, that action is completed when the plan is approved. The land
use plan is the ‘proposed action’ contemplated by the regulation. There is no ongoing ‘major
Federal action’ that could require supplementation . . . .” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
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Together with Lujan and Ohio Forestry, SUWA established a
trilogy of constraints on the public’s ability to challenge federal
168
agency land use decisions. After Lujan, citizens lacked standing to
bring programmatic challenges against agency land management
policies; they were left with challenging only individual action taken
169
under the same policy of revoking land withdrawals. Then, in Ohio
Forestry, citizens lost the ability to challenge the terms of land use
170
Finally, the
plans outside the context of a site-specific action.
SUWA decision deprived citizens of the ability to compel an agency
to fulfill most of its commitments in a federal land plan, or even to
compel an agency to take a “hard look” at whether it had a duty to
supplement its NEPA analysis for a plan due to changed
circumstances or new information, apparently confining supplemental
171
NEPA analysis to plan amendments or revisions. The combination
of the three cases appeared to amount to a straightjacket on public
challenges to agency land use plans.
III. SUWA’S EFFECT ON LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
SUWA’s effect on environmental litigants was both immediate
172
and chilling.
The Supreme Court had accepted certiorari on
another land plan challenge during the 2004 term, a Ninth Circuit
decision concluding that the Forest Service had a nondiscretionary
duty to maintain the wilderness characteristics in WSAs in
173
After its decision in SUWA, the Court vacated the
Montana.
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of

168. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
169. Id. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing Lujan).
170. Ohio Forestry v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998). See supra notes 110-18 and
accompanying text (discussing Ohio Forestry).
171. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 55. See supra notes 142-67 and accompanying text (discussing
SUWA).
172. SUWA’s effect on wilderness in Utah has been especially harsh. After the Court’s
decision, the Bush Administration entered a settlement agreement with the state of Utah
revoking post-1991 WSAs in the state and eliminating new designations. See Henry Weinstein,
Utah Wilderness Appeal Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A27; see also Blumm, supra note
123, at 10, 406–07 (noting that in the 2003 Utah settlement, BLM agreed not to manage lands as
WSAs not identified prior to 1993, including 2.6 million acres identified as WSAs in a 1999
inventory, and the Department of Interior also agreed to revoke the Wilderness Handbook and
other policies directing BLM to use the land planning process to identify potential wilderness
areas); see also Perch-Ahern, supra note 100, at 422–29 (discussing early responses to SUWA in
the lower courts).
173. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003).
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174

SUWA.
SUWA also led to the near-immediate reversal of another
Ninth Circuit decision which held that the Forest Service’s failure to
consider the fifty-seven rivers in Arizona qualifying for potential
inclusion in the Wild and Scenic River System when revising forest
175
After SUWA,
plans was actionable under APA as a failure to act.
the Ninth Circuit withdrew its earlier opinion and ruled that the
agency’s failure “to consider” was not a “discrete agency action,” and
176
thus environmentalists lacked standing to bring their suit. Although
177
SUWA did not entirely preclude judicial review of land plans, it has
severely constricted the public’s ability to challenge agency action on
178
Litigants must now instead challenge individual
a land plan level.
actions taken under land use plans, even if it is the terms of the plans
179
themselves that are objectionable.

174. Veneman v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 542 U.S. 917 (2004). On remand, the Ninth
Circuit sent the case back to the district court. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 376
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).
175. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 335 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2003) (placing heavy
reliance on the original Ninth Circuit Montana Wilderness Association opinion). When the
Supreme Court remanded Montana Wilderness Association, 542 U.S. 917, the Ninth Circuit
reconsidered its decision and reversed itself. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d
1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005).
176. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 394 F.3d at 1113.
177. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 (D. Or. 2006)
(holding that BLM’s approval of projects without sufficient information about wilderness values
to make a reasoned decision of environmental impacts violated NEPA); Friends of Yosemite
Valley v. Scarlett, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1089-90 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that SUWA did not
preclude an action challenging a record of decision adopting a revised plan); Soda Mountain
Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1259-60 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (distinguishing
SUWA both because the challenged action was an affirmative decision to amend a plan and
because the original plan contained language stating the plan represented “BLM’s commitment
to these public desires and constitutes a compact with the public” to consolidate public lands
with outstanding recreation opportunities or imperiled biological resources); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that it
was arbitrary and capricious for BLM to approve a land management plan without taking the
presence of listed species into consideration); W. Watersheds Project v. Bennett, 392 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1227-28 (D. Idaho 2005) (rejecting a BLM argument that land use plan provisions were
unenforceable under SUWA and holding that BLM’s failure to comply with a land plan’s
monitoring requirements violated the land use plan).
178. See Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F. Supp. 2d 835, 845 (S.D. Ohio
2005) (holding that SUWA foreclosed a claim to compel the Forest Service to prepare a
supplemental EIS for a forest plan when an endangered species was discovered in a forest and
the existing forest plan did not reflect the species’ presence); Shawnee Trail Conservancy v.
Nicholas, 343 F. Supp. 2d 687, 712-14 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (ruling that under SUWA, the Forest
Service could not be compelled by recreationalists to undertake a trail maintenance program
that could lead to reinstatement of ORV use in a national forest).
179. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69-70 (2004).
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Federal agencies have argued that SUWA bars numerous types
180
of challenges to land planning decisions in a variety of contexts.
Paul Smyth, Acting Associate Solicitor for the Division of Land and
Water Resources for the Department of Interior, described the
decision as adding a new weapon for federal agencies to deploy in
litigation “in a wide range of public land and natural resource cases
181
and beyond.”
BLM characterized the land plan ORV use
monitoring requirements, as well as the agency’s land inventorying
182
responsibilities, as “agency conduct.”
BLM not only argued in
SUWA that its land plans were not ongoing agency actions, the
agency also maintained that broad categories of activities were
unreviewable and “emphasized the difference between agency
183
The agency contended that while
conduct and agency action.”
agency “actions” were reviewable under the APA, agency “conduct”
was not because it did not fit within the definition of the five types of
184
agency action reviewable under the APA.
These arguments may have been a response to an unfavorable
Ninth Circuit decision that interpreted land plans to have “ongoing
185
That case, Pacific
effects extending beyond their mere approval.”
Rivers Council v. Thomas, required the Forest Service to undertake
ESA consultation on the effects that already-approved forest plans
might have on newly listed salmon species, rejecting the agency’s
argument that land management plans are not ongoing actions, and
instead describing plans to be “comprehensive management
[documents] governing a multitude of individual projects . . . hav[ing]
186
an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption.” The Forest
Service suffered a similar setback in Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v.
U.S. Forest Service, when the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest
Service violated NFMA by failing to demonstrate that a timber sale

180. See Paul B. Smyth & Christina S. Kalavritinos, The Supreme Court’s Decision: More
than Another Lujan?, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 279, 280 (2004).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 293. FLPMA requires BLM to maintain and update an inventory of the public
lands and their resources under its management. 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (2000).
183. Smyth & Kalavritinos, supra note 180, at 293.
184. Id. The APA defines the term “agency action” to include “the whole or part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, [or] relief.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000). See supra notes 14652 (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of “agency action” in SUWA).
185. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994).
186. Id. at 1053.
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187

was consistent with the forest plan for the Payette National Forest.
The SUWA victory marked a significant reversal of fortune for the
federal land managers, reducing their public accountability by
reversing the accepted perception of land plans as enforceable
188
documents with lasting effects.
The SUWA decision has been interpreted to be “significant for
its recognition of the importance of administrative flexibility” and to
prevent challenges in a range of situations in which the agency has
189
failed to take a discretionary action.
Land management agency
lawyers have argued that SUWA bars a number of claims requesting
that various agency actions be set aside as arbitrary and capricious
because a great deal of agency activity does not in fact rise to the level
190
The result has been the
of an “action” under the APA.

187. 137 F.3d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1998). NFMA requires the Forest Service to demonstrate
that site-specific projects are consistent with the applicable forest plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)
(2000). In Cuddy Mountain, the Ninth Circuit held that a timber sale was inconsistent with the
forest plan because the plan required the Forest Service to evaluate the effect of actions on
species dependant on old-growth forest habitat by analyzing the effects of the action on certain
management indicator species, and the Forest Service failed to analyze how the sale would
effect old-growth habitat for the pileated woodpecker habitat, a management indicator species.
137 F.3d at 1377.
188. Before SUWA and Ohio Forestry, challenges to land plans were generally considered
ripe, and the plans themselves were enforceable on their terms. See Res. Ltd., Inc. v.
Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the Forest Service’s argument that a
challenge to the forest plan for the Flathead National Forest would not be ripe unless it was
brought in the context of a site-specific action); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699,
703 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “plaintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific project when
their grievance is with an overall plan”); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 708
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding a Forest Service decision not to supplement the NEPA analysis on a
forest plan was ripe because “to the extent these [plans] pre-determine the future, the
Secretary’s failure to comply with NEPA represents a concrete injury that would undermine any
future challenges”); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that if challenges could not be brought against an EIS that was not site-specific the
program could never be reviewed, and noting “[t]o the extent that the plan pre-determines the
future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point, have standing to
challenge”). The effect of this turnabout in the enforceability of land plan terms is most
dramatically demonstrated by two Ninth Circuit decisions which were reversed in SUWA’s
immediate aftermath: Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2005),
which is discussed supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text; and Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003), which is discussed supra notes 173-74 and
accompanying text.
189. Smyth & Kalavritinos, supra note 180, at 287-88.
190. An example of agency conduct not rising to the level of an “action,” and thus arguably
unreviewable under SUWA, is BLM’s responsibility to conduct land inventories under FLPMA;
which DOI attorney Paul Smyth has maintained are not actions because they do not “change or
prevent change of the management or use of the public lands.” Id. at 293, citing 43 U.S.C. §
1711(a) (2000). Section 551 of the APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or part
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transformation of land use plans from enforceable documents
developed in a public process and providing the foundation for land
management decision making into vague aspirational statements
offering little or no opportunity for the public to obtain judicial
review of an agency’s land management decisions.
A. Environmental Challenges Precluded by SUWA
The SUWA decision led to a series of government victories in
cases challenging Forest Service and BLM grazing decisions in
Oregon filed by the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA).
For example, in ONDA v. Taylor, a district court relied on the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of SUWA in Center for Biological Diversity to
conclude that grazing assessments, evaluations, and determinations
required by BLM’s FLPMA regulations were not discrete agency
191
actions.
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected ONDA’s
contention that BLM failed to undertake a discrete action when it did
not begin promised rangeland health assessments in seven grazing
192
management areas in Eastern Oregon.
In another case, ONDA v. Rasmussen, a district judge rejected
ONDA’s claim that BLM violated FLPMA by failing to maintain an
inventory of wilderness values for an Eastern Oregon grazing area
193
that BLM concluded lacked wilderness values in a 1989 inventory.
ONDA also argued that BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider
of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).
191. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Taylor, No. 04-334-KI, 2005 WL 106599, at *5 (D. Or. Jan.
18, 2005), (relying on Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Center for Biological Diversity is discussed supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
192. Taylor, 2005 WL 106599, at *6. Federal Rangeland Health regulations require BLM to
develop state standards and guidelines for managing livestock grazing on public lands consistent
with ecological criteria to ensure watershed health, water quality, and wildlife habitat are
maintained or restored on public rangelands. 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (2006). These regulations also
authorize BLM to conduct an assessment of whether the standards are being met in an area and,
if they are not, to take action to help move the area toward compliance with the standards. 43
C.F.R. § 4180.2(c) (2006). ONDA argued that when BLM failed to perform such assessments
on seven grazing management areas in the Jordan Resource Area, the agency failed to make a
mandatory determination of whether the area met the rangeland health standards. Taylor, 2005
WL 106599, at *4. The court rejected this argument, holding that under SUWA, a failure to
consider certain issues in making planning decisions does not constitute a failure to take a
discrete agency action. Id. at *5.
193. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 (D. Or. 2006). FLPMA requires BLM to maintain a current
inventory of the lands and their resources under its management. 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (2000).
ONDA argued that by failing to maintain an inventory of the area’s wilderness values, BLM
failed to identify additional WSAs the agency overlooked in the initial 1989 inventory.
Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1206–07.
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both whether the area’s wilderness values had changed based on new
evidence that some areas contained wilderness characteristics
warranting designation as a WSA, and whether proposed grazing in
194
the area might have a negative effect on these wilderness values.
The Rasmussen court relied on Center for Biological Diversity v.
Bureau of Land Management, a California district court case in which
environmentalists presented similar arguments, to conclude that BLM
did not violate FLPMA by failing to maintain a current inventory, but
the agency did violate NEPA by not considering sufficient
195
information about species to make a reasoned decision. In ONDA
v. Bureau of Land Management, ONDA made similar arguments,
claiming that BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider new
information indicating the presence of additional WSAs and violated
FLPMA by failing to maintain a current wilderness inventory before
196
approving its Southeast Oregon land use plan.
The magistrate
judge ruled against ONDA on both counts, holding that the NEPA
claim failed because a wilderness inventory “does not by itself change
the management or use public lands” and that the FLPMA claim was
not ripe for review because the land plan did not authorize any site197
ONDA has appealed this
specific actions, citing Ohio Forestry.
198
decision to the Ninth Circuit.

194. Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
195. Id. at 1212–13.
196. No. Civ. 03-1017-JE, 2005 WL 711663, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2005).
197. Id. at *4-*5.
198. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., No. 05-35931 (9th Cir. Jun. 8, 2006). ONDA has made similar arguments in three other
cases. In ONDA v. Shuford, an Oregon district judge rejected ONDA’s arguments that BLM
violated NEPA when it failed to take a hard look at new information indicating additional
potential WSAs existed before adopting its Andrews-Steens land use plan and violated FLPMA
by failing to maintain an inventory of wilderness values in the area. No. 06-242-AA, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 42614, (D. Or. Jun. 8, 2007). The court held that here, unlike Rasmussen, BLM
fulfilled its NEPA obligations because it considered – and largely rejected – the ONDA
assessments of the area’s wilderness characteristics. Id. at *7-*8. The court also rejected
ONDA’s FLPMA claims, holding that SUWA barred any failure to act claim because
maintaining an existing inventory was within the agency’s discretion, and further, that ONDA
failed to demonstrate that BLM’s existing inventory was so outdated and inaccurate as to render
the decision to approve the land use plan arbitrary and capricious. Id. at *9-*11.
In ONDA v. Gammon, ONDA challenged BLM’s decision to adopt its Lakeview land
use plan without considering new information that additional WSAs existed in the area in its
NEPA analysis and because BLM failed to maintain a wilderness inventory under FLPMA. No.
06-523-HO, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48083, at *1- *2 (D. Or. Jun. 28, 2007). Citing SUWA, the
court rejected ONDA’s argument that BLM violated FLPMA by failing to maintain a current
wilderness inventory, stating that such claims “are not susceptible to judicial enforcement.” Id.
at *8. Further, the court ruled in favor of BLM on the NEPA claim, holding that the agency
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Another ONDA suit affected by SUWA concerned a challenge
to the Forest Service’s failure to comply with several provisions of the
199
Wild & Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA).
The WSRA requires the
Forest Service to prepare a “comprehensive management plan” for
200
ONDA claimed that the Forest
each designated river segment.
Service had failed in its duty to “provide for the protection of the
river values, address resource protection and other management
201
practices” for two Oregon WSRA river segments, and that the
agency also failed to manage the protected rivers “in such a manner
as to protect and enhance” the values which earned the river
202
The district court
segments protection under the WSRA.
concluded that both provisions created general duties for the agency
but neither required any discrete agency action, and therefore the suit
203
was barred under SUWA. Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court on another issue in the case – whether the Annual
Operating Instructions (AOI) the Forest Service issued to grazing
permit holders each year were final agency actions – it did not disturb
204
the lower court’s WRSA rulings.
In a case decided shortly after SUWA, an Illinois district court
ruled that an ORV user group’s attempt to compel the Forest Service
to conduct an ORV use analysis in the Shawnee National Forest was
205
The ORV group had challenged the Forest
barred by SUWA.
acted within its discretion and thus did not violate NEPA when it issued the Lakeview land use
plan without updating its wilderness inventories. Id. at *9. Another case, ONDA v. Freeborn, is
pending before the district court. In Freeborn, ONDA challenged a BLM rangeland project in
Louse Canyon, located in the Jordan Resource Area, arguing that BLM failed to consider the
effect of proposed activities on wilderness values in the area by not updating its wilderness
inventory for the area. Complaint at 2, ONDA v. Freeborn, Civ. No. 06-1311-MO (D. Or. Sept.
14, 2006).
199. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv. (ONDA), No. 03-213-JO, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43637, at *8 (D. Or. Jun. 3, 2005).
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1) (2000). The Forest Service completed management plans for
the two river segments at issue in the suit. ONDA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43637, at *36.
201. ONDA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43637, at *36.
202. Id. at *37.
203. Id. at *37-*38.
204. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006). The
Ninth Circuit held that AOIs were final agency actions because they “represent[ed] the
consummation of the Forest Service’s determination regarding the extent, limitation, and other
restrictions on a permit holder’s right to graze his livestock under the terms of the permit,” and
therefore were properly characterized as a final agency decision. Id. at 986-87. The Forest
Service argued that AOIs were neither “final” actions nor even “agency actions” under SUWA.
Id. at 985. The Ninth Circuit concluded that an AOI, as part of a grazing permit, was a license,
and thus within the scope of “agency actions” identified as actionable in SUWA. Id. at 990.
205. Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. Nicholas, 343 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701 (S.D. Ill. 2004).
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Service’s failure to conduct an ORV use analysis because a court
206
order from an earlier case prevented the Forest Service from
allowing ORV use under its forest plan for the area until the agency
207
analyzed the environmental effects.
The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the order required the Forest Service to
refrain from allowing ORV use in the forest until it completed its
analysis, but the order created no binding agency commitment to
208
undertake that analysis unless it authorized ORV use.
B. Supplemental EISs on Land Use Plans After SUWA
Federal litigants have argued, with some success, that SUWA not
only bars claims to compel an agency to supplement its NEPA
analysis for a land use plan but also bars claims to compel an agency
to supplement its NEPA analysis for other actions, including issuing
licenses, and approving timber sale contracts, and land use plan
209
amendments.
After SUWA, several district courts have ruled that
once an agency approves a land use plan or issues a license, there is
210
no ongoing action requiring supplemental NEPA analysis.
For
example, in Cold Mountain v. Garber, the Ninth Circuit held, with
virtually no analysis, that SUWA barred the environmentalists’ claim
that NEPA required supplemental analysis for a Forest Service
special use permit allowing the Montana Department of Livestock to
operate a “bison capture facility” just outside Yellowstone National
Park in the Gallatin National Forest, based on new information that
measures intended to protect bald eagles in the area failed, and that

206. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. May 28,
1997).
207. Shawnee Trail Conservancy, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
208. Id. at 702.
209. See Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 110102 (D. Mont. 2006) (SUWA barred a claim that the Forest Service failed to supplement its
NEPA analysis for a forest plan amendment); cf. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody,
468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a Forest Service argument that land use plan
amendments did not require NEPA analysis). In one case, the federal government argued,
unsuccessfully, that SUWA obviated the need for supplemental NEPA analysis for timber sale
contracts which had been enjoined by court order. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. United
States Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1222 (D. Or. 2006).
210. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that after the
Forest Service issued a license, it had no obligation to supplement the NEPA analysis because
there was no ongoing action); Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F. Supp. 2d 835,
844 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that the Forest Service had no obligation to supplement NEPA
analysis for a forest plan, even though an ESA-listed species was discovered in the forest).

142

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 18:105

211

the state violated the conditions of its permit. The court concluded
that the Forest Service’s approval of the special use permit was
analogous to issuing a license, and therefore a final action with no
212
further NEPA obligations once the agency issued the license.
The forest plan for the Wayne National Forest, at issue in Ohio
Forestry, was again challenged unsuccessfully by environmentalists in
213
2005, in Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Service. The district
court held that SUWA barred an environmentalist claim that the
Forest Service had to supplement the EIS on the forest plan after the
Indiana bat, listed under the ESA, was discovered in the forest—the
court reasoned that under SUWA once the agency approves a forest
plan, the action is final, and thus there is no remaining action
214
triggering a supplemental EIS.
Similarly, in Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, a Montana federal district judge ruled that after SUWA,
forest plan amendments, like forest plans themselves, were not
ongoing agency actions that could require the Forest Service to
215
The court rejected the
supplement its NEPA analysis.
environmentalists’ argument that the Forest Service should have
supplemented its NEPA analysis for a forest plan amendment,
designed to protect endangered grizzly bears by reducing the number
of roads in the forest, when new information indicated an increase in
216
grizzly bear deaths. The court thought that SUWA barred the claim
because, like the land plan challenged in SUWA, the Forest Service
217
completed its action when it approved the forest plan amendments.
Although the amendments required future agency action to move
toward compliance with its road density standards and called for the
Forest Service to meet milestones demonstrating its compliance, these
future actions were not ongoing actions because the court concluded
211. 375 F.3d at 891. The “bison capture facility” authorized by the special use permit was
intended to help the state of Montana prevent wild bison from Yellowstone National Park from
spreading brucellosis, a bovine bacterial infection which causes sterility in livestock, to Montana
cattle. The special use permit allowed the state to operate a facility to monitor, test, and remove
bison testing positive for brucellosis, and authorized the state to use “hazing” to drive bison
back into the park. Id. at 886-87.
212. Id. at 894.
213. 378 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45.
214. Id. at 845. This result directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s position regarding the
Endangered Species Act in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994),
discussed supra notes 185-86.
215. 465 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1100-01 (D. Mont. 2006).
216. Id. at 1101.
217. Id. at 1100-01.
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that “the amendments do not require that any particular project be
218
done.”
On the other hand, in Sierra Club v. Bosworth, a Northern
California federal district court rejected the Forest Service’s
argument that under SUWA, it had no obligation to supplement an
EIS based on new information about the pacific fisher for four timber
sales, two of which were located in Giant Sequoia National
Monument, and the other two in the adjacent Sequoia National
219
Forest.
The court distinguished SUWA, where there was no
ongoing federal action after BLM approved a land plan, from a
decision to approve a timber sale contract, holding that the latter was
an ongoing action because the timber projects were site-specific
actions that had not yet been completed and were subject to contract
220
clauses allowing the Forest Service to terminate the contract.
An Oregon district court also rejected the Forest Service’s
argument that there was no ongoing federal action, and thus no duty
to supplement its NEPA analysis, after the district court enjoined the
agency’s decision to award six timber sale contracts in the Mt. Hood
221
Because the court set aside the
and Willamette National Forests.
Forest Service’s original decision to award the timber contracts, it
concluded that a federal action requiring supplemental NEPA
222
analysis remained.
In Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody, BLM argued
that modifications to an existing land management plan based on an
annual species review did not amend the land use plan and therefore
223
A
did not require supplemental NEPA analysis under SUWA.
224
district court agreed.
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
rejecting the agency’s argument and ruling instead that the annual
218. Id.
219. Id. at 935-39.
220. Id. at 939. The court also distinguished Cold Mountain, discussed supra notes 210-12
and accompanying text, because the special use permit involved there was a license which did
not anticipate ongoing agency obligations as the timber contracts did. Id.
221. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1222 (D.
Or. 2006).
222. Id. at 1222.
223. 468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006), reversing Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., No. 03-3124-CO, 2006 WL 448714, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2006) (holding that a
BLM decision to modify the survey and manage protections for the red tree vole did not amend
the land use plan).
224. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 2006 WL 448714, at *2 (holding that annual species
reviews did not amend the land use plan and therefore BLM had no obligation to update its
NEPA analysis).
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species reviews in fact amended the land use plan, and SUWA did not
completely absolve an agency from supplementing its NEPA analysis
225
when it amends a land use plan.
In sum, federal agencies have experienced considerable, if not
universal, success in arguing that they have no obligation to
supplement their NEPA analysis after SUWA. Courts have found
this argument persuasive when the NEPA analysis concerned a final
action, and the challenge is to the agency’s implementation that
226
action, such as a license, ongoing management of a forest under an
227
or commitments in a forest plan
approved forest plan,
228
amendment. SUWA has not absolved agencies from all obligations
to provide supplemental NEPA analysis, however. Courts have held
that ongoing actions, such as the Forest Service’s management of
229
timber contracts for projects that are not yet complete, as well as
230
the initial decision to approve a forest plan amendment, still require
supplemental NEPA analysis.
C. Land Plan Challenges Not Barred by SUWA
Just as Ohio Forestry’s ruling that a challenge to a forest plan was
not ripe limited but did not eviscerate the public’s ability to challenge
forest plans, SUWA did not preclude all attempts to enforce the terms
of federal land use plans. Shortly after the Court’s SUWA decision, in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, a California district
court rejected BLM’s argument that an attempt to compel the agency
to comply with a California law requiring dam operators to allow
sufficient river flow for fish passage was a programmatic challenge,
231
The court ruled that
and thus barred by both SUWA and Lujan.

225. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 468 F.3d at 561.
226. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing Cold Mountain).
227. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (discussing Buckeye Forest Council).
228. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing Cabinet Resource Group).
229. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club and Oregon
Natural Resources Council Action).
230. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands
Center).
231. 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 915-16 (E.D. Cal. 2004). The environmentalists alleged BLM’s
operation of Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River violated a California statute requiring dam
operators to allow sufficient water for fish passage and to protect fish populations below the
dam. Id. at 910. The Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Secretary of Interior to comply with
applicable state laws in operating dams under the act. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2000). The California
law stated that dam owners “shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through a fishway, or
in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to
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BLM’s obligation to comply with the state law was a discrete,
required action—not a “general statutory directive”—and
232
distinguished SUWA on that ground.
Similarly, in Western Watersheds Project v. Bennett, a federal
district judge in Idaho rejected BLM’s argument that land plan
233
Environmentalists
provisions were unenforceable under SUWA.
argued that BLM violated FLMA’s requirement that the agency
manage lands consistent with land plans by approving increased
grazing without first monitoring for sensitive species in the Jarbidge
Resource Area in southern Idaho, even though the land plan stated
that grazing “would not be authorized unless monitoring studies
indicate that the basic soil, vegetation and wildlife resources are being
234
The court
protected and additional forage is available.”
distinguished SUWA as limited to the context of an agency’s failure to
act, and therefore inapplicable in the context of a challenge to an
235
agency action inconsistent with an approved land use plan.
In Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Scarlett, an Eastern California
district judge ruled that SUWA did not bar a challenge brought by
environmentalists to the National Park Service’s implementation of a
land plan for the Merced River corridor prepared under the
236
And in Soda Mountain Wilderness Council v. Norton,
WSRA.
another California district judge rejected BLM’s argument that
SUWA precluded an environmentalist claim under FLPMA,
237
The court noted that,
distinguishing SUWA on several grounds.
unlike SUWA, the challenge involved a final agency action: BLM’s
keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the dam.” CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE § 5937 (2007).
232. Natural Res. Def. Council, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
233. 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Idaho 2005).
234. Id. at 1227 (citing Jarbidge Resource Area Resource Management Plan Record of
Decision at I-7 (1987)). Under FLPMA, BLM must manage the public lands consistent with
land use plans. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000).
235. Western Watersheds Project, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. Because BLM’s actions were
inconsistent with a land use plan EIS prioritizing wildlife protection over grazing interests, the
agency violated FLPMA’s requirement that BLM manage lands consistent with land use plans.
Id. at 1227-28.
236. 439 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1089-90 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The management plan was prepared
under a court order after environmentalists first challenged the National Park Service’s failure
to prepare a comprehensive management plan for a segment of the Merced River corridor
under its jurisdiction after it had been designated a WSRA. After NPS issued a management
plan and EIS, environmentalists challenged both, and the original plan was invalidated by the
Ninth Circuit for failing to comply with NEPA by inadequately considering ORV use in the
area. Id. at 1077-78.
237. 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1259-60 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
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238

decision to amend a land use plan.
In addition, the court also
concluded that BLM had made a binding commitment to engage in a
239
specified process before consolidating or disposing of public lands.
Environmentalists argued, and the court agreed, that language in the
record of decision for the land plan stating that it “represents BLM’s
commitment to these public desires and constitutes a compact with
the public” indicated the type of “binding commitment” the Supreme
Court stated was necessary to make a land use plan enforceable on its
240
Ascertaining precisely what amounts to the binding
terms.
241
commitment the SUWA opinion called for will likely produce
considerable litigation in the future.
BLM was likewise unsuccessful in arguing that SUWA bars
challenges to inadequate NEPA analysis at the time a land use plan is
approved in Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land
242
The court held that BLM’s NEPA analysis for its
Management.
land use plan for the Algodones Dunes in Southern California was
inadequate because it failed to take the required “hard look” at the
243
Environmentalists
effect of the land plan on endemic vertebrates.
also argued that BLM’s failure to maintain a current inventory for the
lands at issue, as required by FLPMA, led the agency to act arbitrarily
244
when it approved its land plan based on an outdated inventory.
Although the court noted that FLPMA did not require BLM to
maintain a current inventory on every species, and that land use plan
monitoring directives were not enforceable under SUWA, it
nonetheless held that BLM acted arbitrarily in approving a land use
plan based on “obviously outdated and inadequate inventories” when
the record contained evidence BLM was aware species not included
245
in the inventory were present in the area. In the wake of SUWA, it
seems that NEPA may impose more enforceable obligations than
does FLPMA.

238. Id. at 1260.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004), discussed supra
notes 159-61.
242. 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
243. Id. at 1163.
244. Id. at 1167. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing FLPMA’s
inventory requirement in the context of ONDA v. Rasmussen).
245. Id. at 1167-68.

Fall 2007]

NORTON V. SUWA

147

D. SUWA’s Litigation Legacy
Although not all land use plan terms are unenforceable after
SUWA, the decision has imposed significant limits on the public’s
ability to judicially challenge land planning decisions.
The
government has successfully argued that under SUWA monitoring,
analysis, and inventory requirements in land plans are
246
unenforceable.
But challenges to other agency actions as being
247
inconsistent with an applicable land use plan, particularly plan
248
provisions that bind an agency to a specific course of action, are not
barred by SUWA. SUWA should also not serve as a defense to
challenges to failures to undertake specific actions where an agency
249
has made a “binding commitment” to undertake, since the APA
expressly authorizes suits to compel an agency to act where it is
250
unlawful for it to not act.
Nor should SUWA serve as a bar to
251
challenges to agency actions implementing such directives, like
annual operating instructions to graziers with Forest Service
252
permits.
While SUWA insulates agencies from having to supplement
NEPA analysis on land plans and similar final actions like issuing
253
licenses or existing land plan amendments, agencies should still be
required to supplement NEPA analysis for ongoing actions like
timber sale contracts, or when an agency approves a land plan
254
SUWA’s holding concerning NEPA supplementation
amendment.
applies only to approved land plans or other agency actions that
“end” when the agency approves the plan or the action. Thus, for
example, the SUWA defense would not seem to excuse a failure to
246. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing Center for Biological
Diversity v. Veneman); supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text (discussing the ONDA
decisions).
247. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing Western Watersheds Project).
248. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (discussing Natural Resources Defense
Council); supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (discussing Friends of Yosemite and Soda
Mountain Wilderness).
249. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (discussing Soda Mountain Wilderness).
250. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
251. See id. § 706(2) (authorizing suits against, inter alia, arbitrary actions, actions
inconsistent with statutory directives, and inconsistent with procedures required by law).
252. See ONDA v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006), discussed supra notes
199-204 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (discussing Cold Mountain, Buckeye
Forest Council, and Cabinet Resource Group).
254. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club, Oregon Natural
Resources Council Action, and Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center).
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prepare supplemental NEPA analysis for a BLM allotment
management plan, when new information or circumstances would
255
trigger NEPA’s supplemental analysis requirements. So the NEPA
role in land management has not been eviscerated by the SUWA
decision, although a recent attempt to change the Forest Service’s
planning regulations would have imposed additional obstacles to
public challenges of land planning decisions, including new
categorical exclusions from NEPA analysis.
IV. SUWA’S INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC LAND PLANNING POLICIES
Although SUWA has had a major effect on the enforceability of
federal land plans, it also had an almost immediate—and dramatic—
effect on the nature of Forest Service planning. At the time the Court
decided SUWA, the Forest Service was already in the process of
making radical revisions to its forest planning regulations, revoking
regulations issued in the waning days of the Clinton Administration
and rewriting the 1982 regulations adopted by the Reagan
Administration, in order to increase agency discretion in land
management decisions and decrease public oversight and judicial
256
enforceability of forest plans. These revisions culminated in a 2005
planning rule, which the Forest Service complemented with a series of
categorical exclusions (CXs) that effectively removed a wide range of
Forest Service activities from environmental review, including (1) fire
suppression and salvage logging; (2) forest plan approval,
amendments, and revisions; and (3) activities related to oil and gas
257
Although a California district court
exploration and development.
255. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) (2000). An allotment management plan is a “document prepared
in consultation with [the permitee] . . . [which, among other things] prescribes the manner in,
and extent to, which livestock operations [on BLM or national forest lands] will be conducted in
order to meet the multiple-use, sustained-yield, economic and other needs and objective as
determined for the lands [by the land management agency].” Id. § 1702(k).
256. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 774–75 (2006)
(discussing the Forest Service’s decision to revoke the Clinton-era planning regulations and
draft a radically different revision of the planning regulations); Katrina M. Kayden, Comment,
Will Paradise Become a Parking Lot?: The Debate Over the Bush Administration’s Overhaul of
Forest Management Regulations, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 291–94 (2006) (discussing the Bush
Administration’s decision to jettison the 2000 planning regulations and the Forest Service’s
development of the 2005 planning regulations).
257. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (discussing the Healthy Forests Initiative
provisions exempting fire suppression and salvage logging from environmental review); infra
notes 306-09 and accompanying text (discussing the 2006 CX for forest planning); and infra
notes 310-12 and accompanying text (discussing the 2007 CX for certain oil and gas
development activities).
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258

enjoined the planning regulations in early 2007, the new CXs have
helped transform Forest Service planning from the meaningful
process Congress designed to both inform and impose limits on
agency decision making through public involvement at the forest
inventory stage into an exercise of largely unchecked agency
discretion.
A. The 2005 Forest Planning Rule Revisions
In NFMA, Congress required the Forest Service to develop
regulations for the forest planning process after convening an
advisory Committee of Scientists populated with experts from outside
259
the agency. By requiring the Forest Service to involve independent
scientists in developing NFMA planning regulations, Congress aimed
to ensure an outside scientific perspective influenced the content of
260
the agency’s regulations. The Forest Service assembled the original
committee to develop the initial 1979 planning regulations, then
reconvened it in 1982 to revise the regulations under the Reagan
261
After efforts to revise Forest Service planning
Administration.

258. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1100 (N.D.
Cal. 2007); see infra notes 289, 290 and accompanying text (discussing the decision to enjoin the
2005 rule because 1) the Forest Service failed to comply with NEPA, 2) the 2005 rule was
outside the scope of the CX the agency claimed applied, and 3) the rule failed to comply with
both APA and the ESA). The Forest Service has attempted to call the ruling into question by
describing it as inconsistent with other recent rulings on forest plans by both the Tenth Circuit
and an Alabama district judge. See Felicity Barringer, Federal Judge Strikes Down Forest
Management Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A9 (noting that Mark Rey, the Department of
Agriculture Undersecretary who oversees the Forest Service, stated other recent decisions
regarding forest plans contradicted the decision); Juliet Eilperin, Judge Suspends Administration
Rules For Managing Forests, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, at A02 (quoting a Forest Service
spokesperson as stating that the other courts “presented with similar circumstances” concluded
that the agency had fulfilled its NEPA obligations). Neither of those cases involved a challenge
to the 2005 rule, however. In Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Service, the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower
court’s decision, ruling that environmentalists failed to demonstrate the Forest Service was
arbitrary and capricious in developing a 2003 CE for small-scale timber harvests. 435 F.3d 1204,
1220–22 (10th Cir. 2006). The Alabama district court decision that Forest Service officials cited
is similarly tangential to the California court’s conclusions about the 2005 rule. In Wildlaw v.
U.S. Forest Service, the court deferred to the Forest Service’s decision that the CE covering
“routine” administrative actions applied to its revisions to a rule governing its administrative
appeal procedures. 471 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2000).
260. See Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The
1999 Report of the Committee of Scientists, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 307 (2000).
261. Id. at 308 (stating that the committee was reconvened in 1982). Congress included the
requirement that the Forest Service develop the planning regulations under the advice of such a
committee both to provide the opportunity to include different perspectives on the regulations
and “because of skepticism regarding the Forest Service’s willingness to incorporate science into
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regulations failed in the early 1990s, the Forest Service assembled a
262
This second committee
second Committee of Scientists in 1997.
released a report in late 1999 entitled “Sustaining the People’s
Lands,” which emphasized both ecological sustainability in forest
planning and increased public participation to provide “early, broad,
263
and significant [citizen] involvement in national forest stewardship.”
The Clinton Administration used the recommendations in the 1999
committee report to develop a revised planning rule, issued in
264
November 2000, with ecological sustainability as its centerpiece. In
addition to ecological sustainability, the 2000 planning regulations
also called for (1) rigorous scientific monitoring and evaluation
requirements, (2) restoration of degraded lands, (3) incorporation of
ecological principles by acknowledging uncertainty and disturbances,
(4) use of species diversity to measure ecological sustainability and
265
forest management decisions, and (5) independent scientific review.
The Bush Administration immediately moved to rescind the 2000
rule in the spring of 2001, first by extending the deadline for
266
Then, in May 2002, the Administration
compliance by a year.
267
In December
pushed the deadline for compliance further back.
2002, the Administration proposed a revised planning rule, stating
that “[c]ompliance with the regulatory direction on such matters as
ecological sustainability and science consistency checks would be
268
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.”
While the 2002
proposed revisions were undergoing public review, the Forest Service
issued an “interpretive rule” in 2004, which declared that until the
management in a serious way.” Id. at 307; see also Hoberg, supra note 26, at 6 (noting NFMA’s
requirement that a committee of scientists must be consulted in formulating the planning
regulations “clearly reflect[ed] a deep congressional distrust for the capacity of the Forest
Service to develop regulations in a manner reflecting the new statutory standards”).
262. Wilkinson, supra note 260, at 308.
263. Id. at 309-10. The report was criticized as overstepping the Committee’s statutory
authority to provide scientific and technical advice by promoting a Clinton Administration
policy agenda of making sustainability the Forest Service’s “primary goal.” Hoberg, supra note
26, at 17.
264. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. § 219
(2000).
265. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 757-58 (5th ed. 2002).
266. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of
Compliance Deadline, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552, 27,553 (May 17, 2001).
267. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of
Compliance Deadline, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,431, 35,432 (May 20, 2002).
268. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Proposed Rules, 67
Fed. Reg. 72,770, 72,772 (Dec. 6, 2002).
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agency promulgated new planning regulations, the 1982 planning rule
would govern forest plan amendments and revisions, except that the
“transition provisions” of the 2000 rule – but not its substantive
269
The 2000 rule’s
provisions – would govern site-specific actions.
transition provisions required the Forest Service to consider the “best
available science” in gauging the effects of a proposed action on
wildlife and forest health, replacing the 1982 management indicator
270
The Forest Service finally
species monitoring requirements.
replaced the 2000 planning rule with a new rule in December 2005,
without holding a public comment period or undertaking any NEPA
271
Further, the 2005
analysis of the rule’s environmental effects.
planning rule cast aside the recommendations of the 1999 Committee
of Scientists report and was developed without any advice of any
272
scientific committee.
Ohio Forestry and SUWA influenced the final 2005 planning rule
significantly. The Forest Service cited language from both cases in its
regulatory preamble to justify its treatment of forest plans as strategic

269. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Use of Best
Available Science in Implementing Land Management Plans, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58056 (Sept.
29, 2004). The transition provisions directed the Forest Service to consider the “best available
science” when making site-specific decisions implementing a forest plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a)
(2007). This “best available science” standard replaced the 1982 regulation’s requirement that
the Forest Service consider the effect of a site-specific action on “management indicator
species,” — wildlife species the 1982 regulation required the Forest Service to monitor as
proxies for overall forest health. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (1982).
270. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning: Use of Best
Available Science in Implementing Land Management Plans, 69 Fed. Reg. at 58,056. See also 36
C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982) (establishing criteria for selecting management indicator species in the
1982 regulations).
271. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1022, 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005). The Forest Service concluded that the
2005 planning rule would “not have environmental effects” because the rule merely “provide[d]
a starting point for project and activity NEPA analysis.” Id. at 1031. The Forest Service also
concluded that the planning rule fit within the scope of a CX in the Forest Service Handbook
that applied to “rules, regulations, or policies to establish Service-wide administrative
procedures, program processes, or instruction.” Id. at 1053–54; see also Forest Service
Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 31.12 (2007).
272. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034. The Forest Service responded to comments that expressed
concern that the agency developed its 2005 planning rule without consulting a committee of
scientists by stating that it was not required to seek the advice of a scientific committee in
revising the planning rule, and that actually the 1999 committee report was the basis for the rule
because “[s]ustainability, public participation, adaptive management, monitoring and
evaluation, the role of science, and the objection process, all concepts in the proposed and final
rule, were recommendations of that report.” Id.
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273

documents, without any resulting on-the-ground effects.
The
regulatory preamble noted that the Ohio Forestry decision described
forest plans as “tools for agency planning and management” that “do
not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing
anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal
license power or authority; they do not subject anyone to any civil or
274
criminal liability; they create no legal rights or obligations.”
Borrowing language from the Court’s opinion in SUWA, the
regulatory preamble described land use plans as “‘tools by which
‘present and future use is projected’” and a more general “statement
275
of priorities.”
The 2005 planning rule seemingly emphasized flexibility over
276
enforceability,
replacing “standards” established in the 2000
277
planning rule with the vaguer term “guidelines,” and expanding the
discretionary authority of agency officials, while reducing the
enforceability of a plan’s provisions against the agency. For example,
an agency decision to deviate from a forest plan’s guidelines will no
278
In contrast to the abandoned
longer require a plan amendment.
2000 planning rule’s emphasis on science-based decision making and
ecological sustainability, the 2005 planning rule called for maximum
279
administrative discretion and decision-making efficiency. The 2005
rule emphasized the “strategic nature” of forest plans and claimed
273. Id. The regulatory preamble stated that “[u]nder the Final Rule, plans will continue to
be strategic in nature, as described by the Supreme Court in Ohio Forestry and SUWA.” Id.
274. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)). The
regulatory preamble also noted that in SUWA, the “Supreme Court also recently recognized the
similar nature of land management plans,” noting that “like a [Forest Service] land management
plan, a BLM plan typically ‘is not a final implementation decision on actions.’” National Forest
System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 Planning Rule, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 1034.
275. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034.
276. See Martin Nie, The 2005 National Forest System Land and Resource Management
Planning Regulations: Comments and Analysis, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 99, 100
(2006) (noting that the 2005 rule replaced the “legally enforceable standards” of earlier
iterations of its planning regulations with “general recommendations,” replacing former
requirements that the agency “shall” take certain actions with language that the agency
“should” proceed in a particular manner – frustrating legal challenges).
277. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1026. The 1982 planning rule referred to plan provisions as both
“standards and guidelines.” Id.
278. See id. (claiming that “[i]f deviation from plan guidelines is appropriate in specific
circumstances, the rationale for deviation should be based on project or activity analysis and
explained fully . . . [h]owever, deviation does not require an amendment to the plan”).
279. See Nie, supra note 276, at 100.
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that forest plans “do not authorize project and activity decisions, but
rather characterize general future conditions and guidance for such
280
decisions.”
The rule acknowledged that the Forest Service might
implement some on-the-ground decisions when a forest plan is
approved, revised, or amended, although it predicted that those
281
The rule
situations would involve “extraordinary circumstances.”
failed to explain what constituted “extraordinary circumstances,” or
how the agency would handle forest plan provisions having
immediate on the ground effects under a planning rule designed to
develop plans with no anticipated effects.
The Forest Service described its 2005 planning rule as
282
“represent[ing] a paradigm shift in planning” — which it certainly
attempted. The rule represented a radical shift from NFMA’s
congressional intent that forest plans were to be meaningful,
prescriptive, judicially-enforceable documents, prepared with public
283
participation and in a manner consistent with NEPA specifications.
Congress envisioned NFMA forest planning as involving the public in
forest management decisions at the forest planning stage, well before
the Forest Service might assume a role of project proponent for a site284
specific action. The idea was to place checks on the Forest Service’s
285
But the 2005
previously unquestioned management decisions.
planning rule seemed to contravene NMFA’s intent by increasing

280. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1025.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1033.
283. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress intended to
alter its relationship with the Forest Service in NFMA by subjecting the agency to significant
oversight).
284. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2000) (requiring public participation in the “development,
review, and revision of land management plans”); Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law
Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1175
(2005) (discussing increased public participation requirements in 1970s-era environmental
legislation, including NFMA); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (noting the
Senate committee report on NFMA included a statement indicating public should be involved
in land management planning “at all levels” of the planning process).
285. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 70 (noting that during the Senate
hearings on NFMA in 1976, Senator Humphrey “observed that the Forest Service’s record had
brought into question the extent to which the agency could be trusted to guard and manage
public resources”). Other members of Congress shared the perception that the Forest Service
needed additional oversight. For example, Senator Floyd Haskell (D. Colo.) stated that with
NFMA, “the era of full delegation of land management decision-making authority to federal
agencies is over.” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 583, 94TH CONG., 1st Sess. (1975)).
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agency discretion and weakening the planning process by the
286
elimination of judicially enforceable standards.
287
The proposed rule generated some 195,000 public comments
and faced fierce opposition, including a proposed House amendment
to a 2003 Interior appropriations bill, an effort that ultimately
288
failed. But an environmentalist challenge to the 2005 rule produced
a 2007 injunction issued by the federal district court for the Northern
289
District of California. This injunction prevented the Forest Service
from implementing the 2005 rule until it complied with NFMA,
290
In response to this decision, the Forest
NEPA, and the ESA.
Service indicated its intent to comply with NEPA by producing an
291
EIS for the 2005 rule.
Even if the Forest Service were to succeed in overturning this
decision on appeal, or were to remedy the defects in its 2005 rule, the
rule’s effect on judicial review of forest plans will be delayed because
any actions taken under forest plans adopted under the 1982 planning
regulation must continue to comply with that regulation, not the 2005

286. Nie, supra note 276, at 105.
287. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000
Planning Rule, Forest 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034.
288. See U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 384 (July 17, 2003),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll384.xml (recording the vote for Rep. Udall’s proposed
amendment to the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2004, H.R. 2691,108th Cong. (1st Session 2003), which was intended to block funding to
implement the Bush Administration’s proposed changes to NFMA, which was defeated by a 198
to 223 vote).
289. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1100 (N.D.
Cal. 2007).
290. Id. The court also held that the Forest Service failed to provide adequate notice and
comment on the 2005 rule, violating the APA, concluding that the “law is clear that an agency
cannot promulgate without notice and comment a final rule that constitutes a ‘paradigm shift’
from the proposed rule for which there was notice and comment.” Id. at 1076. The court
concluded that the Forest Service violated NEPA when it employed a CX that was
inappropriate, and the court found the fact that the Forest Service subsequently issued a new
CX covering forest planning to “support[] the conclusion that the prior [CX] that was utilized in
this case did not fit the 2005 rule.” Id. at 1087. In addition, the court held that the Forest
Service violated the ESA when it concluded that the 2005 rule would not affect listed species
without first initiating section 7 consultation to determine whether the rule “may affect” listed
species. Id. at 1091. See also Enviros Will Likely Contest FS Rule on no Planning EIS, PUBLIC
LAND NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.plnfpr.com/newsletter1/P107
Jan5.htm#PG3 (discussing the likelihood of environmentalists amending their complaint to
contest the 2006 forest plan CX).
291. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,775, 26,775 (May
11, 2007) (noting that the Forest Service plans to produce a draft EIS by June 2007 and
complete a final EIS for the 2005 rule by November 2007).
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292

rule.
Although the Forest Service has argued the 2005 regulations
apply to management decisions for existing forest plans approved and
implemented according to the 1982 regulations, several district court
decisions indicate that forest plans will continue to be governed by
the 1982 regulations, not the 2005 regulations, until the Forest Service
either revises the applicable land use plan or promulgates a new
293
one.
B. The Proliferation of Categorical Exclusions
NEPA directs federal agencies to analyze the effects of any
“major [f]ederal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
294
environment” in an environmental impact statement (EIS) on that
295
Agencies need not prepare an EIS on every federal
action.
296
The
action—that would create an administrative nightmare.

292. Site-specific actions adopted according to the 2004 “interpretive rule” are governed by
the 2000 rule’s “transition provisions” – not the 1982 rule – unless a site-specific decision
specifically adopts the standards from the 1982 rule. See Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. United States
Forest Serv., 451 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (ruling that a forest plan may require by
reference particular standards “regardless of later changes in the regulations” and concluding
that the 1982 regulations did not apply to a timber sale when the applicable forest plan did not
adopt any specific regulatory provision by reference); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F. 3d
1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that when a forest plan adopted the 1982 rules by
reference, that rule governed subsequent actions taken under the plan). See also supra notes
269-270 (discussing the 2004 interpretive rule and the 2000 rule’s transition provisions).
293. See Idaho Wildlife Fed’n v. Tower, No. CV-04-372-E-BLW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23140, at *4 (D. Idaho April 13, 2006) (holding that the 1982 regulation governed a forest plan
adopted under that regulation, rejecting a Forest Service argument that the environmentalists’
claim that the agency failed to maintain sage grouse viability in the Curlew National Grassland,
a Management Indicator Species (MIS), was moot because the Forest Service did not have the
same obligations toward MIS under the 2005 rules as under the 1982 regulation); Sierra Nevada
Forest Prot. Campaign v. Tippin, No. Civ. S 06-00351 FCD DAD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57832,
at *47 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (rejecting the Forest Service’s argument that the 2005 rules
applied to the timber project, and holding that a forest plan prepared under the 1982 planning
regulation continued to govern the forest plan and projects it authorized). See also Utah Envtl.
Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the Forest Service’s
management obligations for projects in the Fishlake National Forest under the 1982 regulations
because the Forest Service adopted the forest plan under those regulations).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
295. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-1502.25 (2007) (stating requirements for when and how to
prepare an EIS). The regulations state that the “primary purpose of an environmental impact
statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in
[NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.” Id. §
1502.1.
296. See id § 1501.4 (establishing criteria for agencies to use to determine whether an EIS is
necessary for a proposed action). In lieu of preparing an EIS, agencies may prepare a shorter
environmental assessment (EA) and, if the EA concludes that the action will not have
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Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) regulations
implementing NEPA allow federal agencies to determine categories
297
of actions that do not have the potential to affect the environment
and authorize agencies to issue CXs that exempt actions from
298
In recent years, the Bush
individual environmental review.
Administration has employed CXs to exempt numerous types of
federal land management decisions which decades of past agency
practice suggested warrant individual environmental review because
of their potentially significant environmental effects.
In 2003, the Bush Administration assembled a NEPA Task
Force, which released a report to the Council on Environmental
299
Quality
recommending, among other things, expanded use of
300
CXs. The Administration began to introduce a number of CXs for
public lands activities that would previously have required
301
individualized environmental review.
For example, in connection
with its Healthy Forests Initiative, the Forest Service issued CXs for
“hazardous fuels reduction” projects and post-fire salvage logging, as
302
The
well as for “thinning” projects intended to reduce fire risk.
significant environmental effects, the agency will issue a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). Id. §§ 1508.9, .13.
297. Id. § 1507.3(b)(2)(ii).
298. Id. § 1508.4. The regulation defines CX as “a category of actions which do not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and for
which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement
is required.” Id.
299. NEPA Task Force, The NEPA Task Force Report to the Council on Environmental
Quality: Modernizing NEPA Implementation 1–3 (2003), available at http://www.nepa.gov/
ntf/report/htmltoc.html.
300. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 353 (discussing how the Forest Service created new
categories of CXs as part of the Healthy Forests Initiative). These CXs “appeared to be a
preemptive strike by the Administration, with the dual aim of accelerating the pace of forest
thinning and salvage logging by eliminating environmental review and taking the underlying
public policy disputes off the table by categorically declaring environmental impact analysis offlimits.” Id. at 353–54; Jesse B. Davis, The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy Policy Choices in
Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVLT. L. 1209, 1224-28 (2004) (describing how, as part of the
Healthy Forests Initiative, the Forest Service issued CXs for post-fire salvage operations and
hazardous fuels reduction, as well as CXs for timber harvests that include up to 70 acres of live
trees, salvage up to 250 acres of dead, dying, or fire-damaged trees, and allow up to 250 acres of
trees to be cut to control insects or disease).
301. See DREHER, supra note 27, at 7-8 (discussing recent proposals to weaken or create
exemptions from NEPA requirements, including a “rebuttable presumption” in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 that the oil and gas activities fall under a CX, an appropriations bill rider
allowing the renewal of grazing permits in national forests over the next three years without
NEPA review, and a proposed CX for forest plans drafted under the 2005 planning rule).
302. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Management
Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, passim (Jun. 5, 2003).
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Forest Service opened the door for such CXs in 2002 by issuing a
“clarification” of when “extraordinary circumstances” would require
environmental analysis for an action that typically fell within the
303
Under the Forest Service Handbook, a CX is
scope of a CX.
appropriate for an action when there are no “extraordinary
304
circumstances” present.
The revised Handbook definition of
“extraordinary circumstances” gave the agency discretion to
determine whether a CX applied to a proposed action, even where
resource conditions created “extraordinary circumstances” that would
305
otherwise make a CX inappropriate.
In December 2006, the Forest Service continued its overhaul of
NFMA forest planning by issuing an interim CX for forest plans, plan
306
The agency claimed that SUWA
amendments, and plan revisions.
and Ohio Forestry provided the legal basis for its conclusion that an
EIS was not required on forest plans, since the agency made no
binding commitments in forest plans, and its plans had no site-specific
307
effects.
Citing the “strategic nature” of plans, the regulatory
preamble to the 2005 planning regulations stated that the Court’s
decisions “support the Forest Service’s conclusion that its land
management plans developed under the 2005 planning rule that
typically will not have independent environmental effects, and thus
308
will not have significant environmental effects.” By recasting forest

303. Clarification of Extraordinary Circumstances for Categories of Actions Excluded from
Documentation in an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,623 (Aug. 23, 2002).
304. Id. at 54,627 (noting that “[ex]traordinary circumstances” exist in the presence of
resource conditions such as species protected under the ESA are present in an area; flood
plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds; wilderness areas, WSAs, or national recreation areas;
inventoried roadless areas; research natural areas; American Indian or Alaska Native religious
and cultural sites; and archaeological sites, historic properties, or areas); Forest Service
Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30.3(2) (2007).
305. Forest Service Handbook, supra note 304; see also Eric E. Huber, Environmental
Litigation and the Healthy Forests Initiative, 29 VT. L. REV. 797, 802 (2005). The Forest Service
issued the 2005 planning rule itself under a CX established in the Forest Service Handbook. See
supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the Forest Service’s decision not to undertake
NEPA analysis of the planning rule).
306. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising,
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481, 75,481
(Dec. 15, 2006).
307. Plan Categorical Exclusion Questions and Answers 2, http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/
plan_ce/includes/q_as.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
308. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising,
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,483.
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309

plans as mere vision statements, the Forest Service eviscerated any
meaningful analysis of the environmental effects of national forest
land planning.
Two months later, in February 2007, the Forest Service issued
another CX in a directive concluding that certain oil and natural gas
exploration and development activities had no potential to have any
310
Critics charged that this
significant effects on the environment.
decision to carry out the president’s policy of expedited review for
energy-related projects, as articulated in Executive Order 13212
311
was yet another example of the Bush Administration
(2001),
312
chipping away at environmental review of Forest Service decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
By enacting NFMA and FLPMA thirty years ago, Congress
committed public land managers to comprehensive land planning.

309. Id. at 75,485 (describing how components of plans developed under the 2005 planning
rule, such as “desired conditions” describe “a vision for the desired condition of the forest” but
do not create binding commitments for the agency). Interestingly, BLM’s regulations continue
to require an EIS on its land use plans. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (2006). Therefore, until the agency
amends these regulations, a CX on BLM land plans would be unlawful.
310. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Oil and Natural Gas
Exploration and Development Activities (Categorical Exclusion), 72 Fed. Reg. 7391, 7392 (Feb.
15, 2007).
311. Id. at 7392 (noting that the Forest Service’s CX applied to additional activities to those
already categorically excluded from NEPA analysis under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which
created a CE for five categories of oil and gas exploration and development activities conducted
under the Mineral Leasing Act).
312. See Forest Service Says Oil and Gas NEPA Exclusion Doesn’t End Run Law, PUBLIC
LAND NEWS, Mar. 2, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.plnfpr.com/newsletter1/P507
March2.htm#PG9 (quoting Mike Anderson, senior resource analyst for The Wilderness Society,
to the effect that Forest Service officials are “being dishonest when they say they don’t need to
do NEPA in plans because they will do NEPA at the project level, but then they don’t do it at
the project level as well”). The oil and gas CX applies to decisions to approve a surface use plan
of operations for oil and natural gas activities, and any initial development activities, so long as
the approval will not result in more than one mile of new road construction or reconstruction,
more than three miles of pipelines, or more than four drill sites. National Environmental Policy
Act Documentation Needed for Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Development Activities
(Categorical Exclusion), 72 Fed. Reg. at 7402. BLM has likewise proposed expanding its use of
CXs to include grazing permit renewals, four new forestry CXs (three based on CXs already
issued by the Forest Service), three new CXs for oil, gas, and geothermal energy development
activities, and new categories of CXs for recreation management and emergency stabilization.
National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing Procedures, 71 Fed. Reg. 4159, 4160
(Jan. 25, 2006). See also Brodie Farquhar, Grazing, Seismic Permits Fall Under Plan, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www.trib.com/articles/2006/01/27/news/
wyoming/557115e50dfe893972571030006de47.txt (discussing BLM’s proposed CXs and noting
that three of the four forestry CXs mirrored those adopted by the Forest Service).
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The benefits of planning as a prerequisite to public land decision
making are many. The planning process attracts public attention
when the focus of land management is on the resources an area
possesses, not on the merits of a particular project. Without a project
and its momentum, agency personnel are in a posture of unbiased
managers rather than project proponents. Moreover, at the planning
stage, with an areawide concentration and a focus on land resources,
the cumulative effects of various potential resource developments can
be evaluated without pressure from project sponsors. The planning
process, in short, can encourage rational decision making in advance
of specific land use decisions. It can also produce predictability, but
only if the plan provisions are specific enough to allocate resources.
Congress embraced this vision of the benefits of public land planning
313
314
in 1976 when it passed both NFMA and FLPMA.
But the landscape of public land planning in the 21st century has
been changed dramatically by both the Supreme Court and the Bush
Administration. In Ohio Forestry, the Court decided that forest plans
were not ripe for review unless the challenged provision would have
on-the-ground effects, and SUWA held that land use plans are not
generally judicially enforceable. Both decisions sharply curtailed the
public’s ability to challenge the consistency of land plans with
governing statutes.
Under the now-enjoined 2005 planning
regulations and the accompanying CX, the Forest Service could
approve a forest plan without analyzing any environmental effects.
Because most land use plan terms are now effectively unenforceable
under SUWA, the public must wait until a specific provision in a land
plan is produces a site-specific action to challenge that provision.
The Forest Service used the SUWA and Ohio Forestry opinions
to justify its radical revision of forest planning in the 2005 planning
rules and its decisions to exempt a number of projects from
315
environmental review.
These decisions run contrary to
congressional intent to make federal land planning the focal point of
316
both NFMA and FLPMA. Instead of promoting informed decision

313. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976).
314. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).
315. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text (discussing how the Forest Service used
the Court’s decisions to support its 2005 planning rule); supra notes 307-08 and accompanying
text (discussing how the Forest Service used the Court’s decision in the 2006 CE for forest plans
adopted under the new rule).
316. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in
adopting NFMA and FLPMA).
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making and restraining agency discretion with increased public
oversight and the potential for judicial enforcement, land planning
has devolved into a series of virtually meaningless exercises
undertaken with minimal public involvement, little judicial
enforceability, and increased administrative discretion in the name of
“efficiency” and “flexibility.”
Federal land managers should not be allowed to abandon land
use planning as Congress envisioned it thirty years ago until Congress
rejects that vision. Regrettably, recent Supreme Court decisions and
the Bush Administration’s actions make it necessary for Congress to
respond to the SUWA, Ohio Forestry, and the 2005 forest planning
regulations by revising the vague planning directives in NFMA and
FLPMA with language that recognizes the critical importance of
federal land plans as significant and ongoing agency actions within the
meaning of the APA. We suggest specific amendments to the APA
to accomplish these goals in the Appendix to this article. These
proposed amendments would (1) assure that federal land plans would
again fulfill the original congressional goals of being the product of
active public participation, (2) focus on rigorous environmental
analysis, and (3) create enforceable commitments by federal land
management agencies. Without such amendments to the APA,
st
federal land planning in the 21 century will devolve into an expensive
charade that wastes taxpayer dollars and deceives the public.
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APPENDIX
To amend the definition of “agency action” contained in 5 U.S.C.
§ 1331(13) to add to the definition of agency action, as follows
(references are to explanatory notes and accompanying text of this
article; existing language in italics):
(13) “agency action” includes the whole or a part of an agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof,
or failure to act; discrete agency actions that are ripe for judicial
review include:
A. approving or amending federal land management plans,
which are binding compacts with the public (n. 240), and
which generally require preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) or supplemental EIS that considers
the effects of the plan on listed an candidate species under
the Endangered Species Act, including new species added to
the list (nn. 178, 186, 214) and designated or potential river
segments for protection under the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act (nn. 175, 199-203, 236), in order to satisfy the National
Environmental Policy Act;
B. implementing commitments in approved federal land
management plans, including monitoring requirements (nn.
131-32, 177, 182, 234, 246) and complying with state law (nn.
231-32);
C. approving site-specific actions consistent with applicable
federal land management plans, including licenses, permits,
timber sales (nn. 221-22, 254), rights-of-way, and similar
actions;
D. maintaining a current inventory of all federal lands and
resources, including an inventory of lands suitable for
inclusion in the national wilderness system (nn. 172, 182, 19395, 198, 246), and annual species reviews (nn. 223-25);
E. approving or amending allotment management plans (n. 255)
or annual operating instructions to grazing permittees (nn.
204, 252).
F. approving and implementing standards for managing
livestock grazing consistent with ecological criteria (nn. 19192); and
G. discovery of listed endangered species on federal lands (nn.
178, 186, 210).

